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“Politics as Markets” Reconsidered: Economic Theory, Competitive 
Democracy and Primary Ballot Access 
by David Schleicher1
Over the past decade, mainstream election law scholarship has been based largely 
on a simple but forceful set of analogies: politics are like markets, parties are like 
competing firms and voters are like consumers that decide at election-time what type of 
public policies they would like to buy.2 This theory has been criticized for taking the 
analogy between markets too far and for relying too heavily on one method – electoral 
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 J.D. Harvard Law School, 2004.  MSc, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2001.  A.B. 
Dartmouth College, 2000.  Special thanks to Heather Gerken, Richard Pildes, Dennis Thompson and the 
members of the 2004 Law and Democracy workshop at Harvard Law School for their comments and 
advice.  Additional thanks to Amanda Kosonen, Scott Michelman and Adam Neufeld for all their help.  All 
mistakes are, of course, my own.  
2
 “In the marketplace of ideas, the idea of the marketplace of ideas enjoys a dominant market share. When 
it comes to legal scholarship dealing with the electoral process, this dominance is reflected in both focus 
and method. Current scholarship seems directed primarily at the aspect of the system that is most expressly 
economic, namely, campaign finance. And even when scholars examine other aspects of the electoral 
system, they phrase their arguments in market rhetoric: They write about ‘lockups,’ ‘rent-seeking,’ ‘agency 
problems,’ and ‘externalities’; they propose antitrust as a model for judicial oversight.”  Pamela Karlan, 
Politics by Other Means, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1697 (1999).  The leading article in the vein is Samuel Issacharoff 
and Richard Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643 
(1998) (Hereinafter Politics as Markets).
2competition – as the solution for all political problems.3  The true problems of the 
“politics as markets” theory, though, lie at the inverse of these criticisms.  Our 
understanding of markets can explain a great deal about electoral behavior, but scholars 
working in this vein have failed to consistently apply the lessons of economic theory, 
particularly a branch known as natural monopoly theory, to their studies of election law.  
Moreover, competition is not too narrow a concept on which to base the regulation of 
elections, but rather is too broad.  There are a number of conflicting normative 
justifications for using competition as a guide for electoral regulation, each of which 
suggest different policy outcomes.  While the Supreme Court has not made itself clear on 
this score, it has created a constitutional election law jurisprudence that does not suffer 
from these flaws.  Its holdings in the area of ballot access law, much pilloried by “politics 
as markets” scholars, are in fact consistent with the application of economic theory to 
electoral markets and feature a balanced approach to the conflicting normative 
justifications for favoring competition.  This paper stands as a defense of the Court’s 
3 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note _, at 1688-89 (“We hold both market and nonmarket understandings of what 
politics is about simultaneously. We are both drawn toward and resistant to understanding politics as 
simply another form of market.  This is a fruitful ambiguity. Incomplete commodification should not be 
seen as simply a transitional phase, as we move from the previous conventional wisdom, which saw the 
political process as an alternative to the market system, to a new equilibrium, which sees politics simply as 
market competition by other means. Rather, it reflects something real and enduring in our understanding of 
politics. Thus, we should neither unquestioningly reject nor wholeheartedly embrace the idea of politics as 
a market.”); DENNIS THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS, 7-8, 167 (2002) (arguing that competition is just one 
among a number of values that should be considered in shaping electoral systems). 
3approach from the viewpoints of both economic theory and competitive democratic 
theory.
I. Introduction: Primary Ballot Access Laws and Optimal Regulation
Political party primaries were not introduced into the American political scene 
until the 1880s,4 and, as such, it is not surprising that the Constitution does not require 
political parties to hold primaries to select their standard bearers for the general election.5
The Constitution leaves regulation of elections to the states,6 and although states are by 
no means obligated to force political parties to use primary elections as a way to select 
their candidates, the Supreme Court made clear that it is “too plain for argument…that 
the State … may insist that intraparty competition be settled before the general election 
by primary election.”7  What is less clear is the extent to which a state can do more than 
just require a primary, but decide the rules by which it will be run. 
The wide range of efforts by states to regulate primaries can be roughly divided 
into two general categories.  The first set involves attempts by the state to either limit or 
4 See Adam Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’s Wrongs: Early Political party Regulation in the State 
Courts, 1886-1915, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 876 (2000)  (“Between 1882 and World War I, state 
legislatures across the country adopted "Australian" (i.e., state-printed, secret) ballot and party primary 
laws to regulate general elections, party nominating procedures, and the internal governance structure of 
parties.”)
5
 The Twenty-Fourth Amendment does make reference to party primaries, but only states that, if held, they 
may not feature poll taxes.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
in any primary or other election … shall not be denied or abridged … by reason of failure to pay any poll 
tax or other tax.”).
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4extend who can be a member of a political party – against the wishes of that party -- for 
the purposes of voting or running for election in primaries.  The second category involves 
attempts by undisputed members of the political parties to overcome state or party rules 
to get onto primary ballots. 
The Supreme Court settled many of the questions about the first type of case in 
California Democratic Party v. Jones.8   It held that a California law that forced parties to 
use a blanket primary in which any voter could participate was unconstitutional, thereby 
granting political parties broad powers to define their own membership, subject to 
limitations against discrimination and, potentially, against party-raiding.9
However, neither Jones nor any other case has provided much guidance on how to 
resolve the second type of case, regarding rules governing access to primary ballots for 
party members.  Lacking guidance from above, lower courts have created a variety of 
often-conflicting rules in these cases.10
Resolving the problems of this messy case law requires weighing the various 
constitutional interests of candidates, voters, political party organizations and states.  In 
8
 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000)
9 Id. at 572, 586.  See also Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (upholding a state rule requiring a 
significant period of party registration in order to avoid party raiding); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 
(1944) (holding that the Democratic Party could not exclude blacks from participating in primary 
elections).
10 Compare, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Governor, 385 Mass. 1201 (1982) with Campbell v. 
Bysiewicz, 242 F. Supp 2d 164 (D.Conn 2003).  See also Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The 
Constitutional Restraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, 89 Geo. L. J. 2181, 2207 (2001) (Hereinafter 
Candidates v. Parties).
5order to do so, it is necessary to develop a theoretical metric for evaluating these relative 
claims. Even if theoretically “thin” opinions maximize judicial flexibility, developing a 
consistent jurisprudence on a topic as complicated as this one will require some 
organizing principle.11
Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have developed one such organizing 
principle, a theory they describe as “politics as markets.”12  They argue that election law 
should attempt to maximize the extent to which voter preference guides the choice of 
elected officials.13  In order to do so, they argue, it is useful to analogize elections to 
markets, voters to consumers and political parties to firms. However, the United States 
uses single member districts for legislative elections and a “first past the post” (FPTP) 
voting system under which the candidate with the most votes wins, no matter what 
percentage of the vote she gets, there is a natural inclination towards having only two 
political parties.  This a natural duopoly, a structural market failure that raises the 
11See Heather Gerken, One Person, One Vote: A Theoretical and Practical Examination of The Costs and 
Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C.L. Rev. 1411, 1434 
(“Another problem stemming from the Court's failure to adopt an adequate intermediary theory is doctrinal 
inconsistency.”)
12 See Politics as Markets, supra note 1, at 643.
13 Id. at 646 (“The key to our argument is to view appropriate democratic politics as akin in important 
respects to a robustly competitive market - a market whose vitality depends on both clear rules of 
engagement and on the ritual cleansing born of competition. Only through an appropriately competitive 
partisan environment can one of the central goals of democratic politics be realized: that the policy 
outcomes of the political process be responsive to the interests and views of citizens.” See also Bruce Cain 
and Nathaniel Persily, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 
Colum. L. Rev. 775, 789 (2000).
6possibility of collusion and makes elections an inefficient means of translating voter 
preferences into policies. 14  To solve this problem, Issacharoff and Pildes turned to anti-
trust law.15  The Constitution should be used to invalidate elections laws that are merely 
efforts by elected officials from the two major parties to take advantage of their dominant 
market position to exclude entry by third-party candidates or to eliminate competition 
through some type of major-party collusive agreement.16
This paper will use the “politics as markets” hypothesis as a way to evaluate the 
various claims of parties, voters and states in ballot access cases.  However, it will argue 
that Politics as Markets and the articles that have followed it have failed are flawed in 
two basic ways: (1) they fail to flesh out the implications of comparing politics to 
markets by ignoring economic theory, particularly natural monopoly theory and (2) the 
14
 In a “first-past-the-post” system (FPTP), the candidate with the most votes in a single round election 
wins the seat.  For a discussion of how FPTP elections promote a two-party system, see Richard Hasen, 
Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats 
and the Republicans From Political Competition, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 331, 367-70 (1997) (hereinafter 
“Entrenching the Duopoly”).  See also notes _ infra and related text.
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 They originally relied on metaphor to corporate lock-ups, but have since abandoned this for the more 
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economic markets.”); Richard Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1614 
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advocate.”)
16 See Politics as Markets, supra note 12, at 647; Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political 
Cartels, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 599 (2003).
7normative lens they embrace fails to capture and balance the variety of normative reasons 
for valuing political competition.    A theory that solved these problems would view 
current Supreme Court doctrine on primary ballot access laws as a success rather than a 
failure of the politics as markets approach.  
a) Natural Monopoly Theory and Election Law
Politics as Markets and the articles that followed proceeded from the description 
of electoral markets as a natural duopoly to an argument that the courts should examine 
election laws the way the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission would 
examine firm behavior in an ordinary market in which a few firms exhibit a great deal of 
market power, focusing on collusive deals and the formation of new barriers to entry.17
This ignores the factors that make electoral markets a “natural,” rather than an ordinary, 
duopoly.  
French political scientist Maurice Duverger found that an electoral system that 
featured both first-past-the-post vote counting and single member electoral districts 
would always tend towards producing a stable two-party system.18  He gave two 
17
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 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans Barbara 
North and Robert North (2d Ed 1959). For discussions of Duverger’s law, see Entrenching the Duopoly, 
8explanations for this: one “psychological,” the other “mechanical.”  The psychological 
explanation is that voters do not like to waste their votes.19  If one assumes that voters 
make their choices in order to influence the election, they will vote for the candidate 
closest to their views with a chance to win. 20  This has the effect of strengthening two 
major parties, because any vote for a third party candidate will not affect the result.  The 
mechanical explanation is that parties that win less than a majority of the vote win no 
seats in the American electoral system.21   This lack of actual success reduces the 
incentives for leaders and donors to support the party.  Self-interested politicians and 
donors flee to the major parties, which are thereby strengthened.  
Implicit in the first of Duverger’s explanations is that, given the structural 
problems of FPTP electoral systems, having only two parties produces the most 
representative elected officials.  This is because it produces majority, rather than 
plurality, elections (i.e., a candidate disfavored by a majority of voters cannot win an 
election because the other side is divided between two candidates).  Having only two 
parties is not only the likely result of a FPTP system, but it is the best result inside such a 
system, if the value one desires to maximize is “representativeness.”  Therefore, rules that 
supra note __, at 367-70; William H. Riker, The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the 
History of Political Science, 76 Am Pol Sci Rev 753, 754 (1982). 
19 See Duverger, supra note 16, at 224.
20
 This has been criticized for violating some public choice ideas of voter participation.  See Riker, supra
note 16, at 764.  However, Hasen notes that there is an extensive literature showing that politicians have 
been successful making the wasted votes argument and that voters in fact do behave this way.  See Hasen, 
supra note 16, at 369.
21 See Duverger, supra note 16, at 226.
9enhance the likelihood of having only two parties increase the chances for this best 
result.22
However, Issacharoff and Pildes are right to note that having a duopoly raises 
concerns that the two parties will not produce a robustly competitive electoral market.  In 
the language of economic theory, a natural duopoly is a structural market failure.  That 
said, its structural nature – because of FPTP elections, we will almost always have only 
two major parties – means that policies that would ordinarily be efficient in dealing with 
a market failure, like the anti-trust approach of Politics as Markets, are not necessarily 
efficient means of regulating a market with this peculiar feature.  
Economists have long attempted to solve a similar problem that besets 
commercial markets, the problem of natural monopoly.  Natural monopolies occur when, 
as a result of peculiar market forces, an industry is most efficient when one firm 
dominates production because of economies of scale.  In these markets (e.g. electricity 
distribution, local telephony), unlike most, it is better for the economy if there is a 
monopoly, but there is the danger that the monopolist will take advantage of its favored 
position.  
The enormous economic and legal literature on natural monopolies is organized 
around the principle that in some markets there are natural barriers to entry and 
promoting the entry of new firms would be inefficient.  The literature advises regulators 
to give natural monopolists the opportunity to entrench themselves, because natural 
22
 This, of course, presumes that political competition between the two parties and the possibility of entry 
(and of replacing one of the existing two parties with another organization) keeps the major parties active in 
their pursuit of voters.  A law that ensured that only two parties could exist would, of course, violate this 
presumption and not enhance the likelihood of a most representative result.
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monopolies only arise, by definition, when “production of a particular good or service by 
a single firm minimizes cost.” 23  However, regulators should make sure that natural 
monopolists do not use their market power to raise prices.  Further, they should try to 
segment related markets that do not feature the structural market failure of natural 
duopoly and thereby create possibilities for free down-stream competition.  
Though courts have used a variety of explanations and theoretical assumptions in 
this murky jurisprudence, almost all of the actual holdings in primary ballot access cases 
follow the natural monopoly model of regulation.  The Supreme Court has permitted 
states to favor a two-party system, which fits with the idea that it is inefficient to replicate 
firms/parties in natural monopoly or duopoly situations.24  The Court has also permitted 
party organizations to define their membership how they see fit,25 but have, potentially, 
limited this right by allowing states to make sure parties do not allow members of other 
23
 W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND 
ANTITRUST, 3rd edition, 2000, MIT press, Pg. 337 (Hereinafter ECONOMICS OF REGULATION).
24 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1996) (“[T]he States' interest permits 
them to enact reasonable election regulations that may, in practice, favor the traditional two-party 
system…and that temper the destabilizing effects of party-splintering and excessive factionalism. The 
Constitution permits the Minnesota Legislature to decide that political stability is best served through a 
healthy two-party system.”) (citations omitted). See also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1986) 
(O'Conner, J., concurring) (“There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-party 
system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective government”); Gaffney v. 
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (“[J]udicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports 
fairly to allocate political power to the [two major] parties in accordance with their voting strength”).
25 See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 583 (2000); Democratic Party of the United 
States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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parties to participate in their primaries.26  These membership rules help keep parties 
distinct from one another, which prevents collusion and thus fosters competition.27  This 
competition limits their ability to take advantage of their favored positions in the political 
firmament.  
The Court, however, has not followed the final important implication of the 
analogy to natural monopoly regulation.  It has never settled on a rule on how the 
Constitution regulates party rules that limit who among party members can be on the 
primary ballot.  It should adopt a rule that ensures downstream, or primary election, 
competition using the constitutional right to associate with candidates of one’s choice to 
ensure that neither states nor party organizations create serious hurdles to primary ballot 
access for party members.  Such a rule would maximize the extent to which elected 
officials were representative of the preferences of voters in an electoral market 
characterized by “natural duopoly,” even if it did not create a perfectly functioning 
market for elections.
26See Tashijan v. Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 213 n.13 (“Our holding today does not establish that state 
regulation of primary voting qualifications may never withstand challenge by a political party or its 
membership. A party seeking, for example, to open its primary to all voters, including members of other 
parties, would raise a different combination of considerations. Under such circumstances, the effect of one 
party's broadening of participation would threaten other parties with the disorganization effects.”).  But see
Cool Moose Party v. Rhode Island, 183 F.3d 80, 88 (1st Cir. 2001); Beaver v. Clingman, 363 F.3d 1048 
(10th Cir. 2004) (holding that state laws stoping parties from allowing members of other parties to vote in 
their primaries are unconstitutional).
27 Rosario, 410 U.S. at 752 (upholding a state law imposing an eleven month waiting period for voting in a 
primary for people switching parties in the interest of avoiding party raiding).
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b) Competitive Democratic Theory and Election Law
Just as the application of economic theory can improve the “politics as markets” 
approach, democratic theory can be mined for insights into how to create a jurisprudence 
out of a theory of political competition.  Many theorists have criticized the idea that 
elections and politics should be understood through a market metaphor because it is too 
simple, reducing the rich realm of democratic society to simple power politics.28  While it 
is beyond the ambit of this paper to respond to this critique,29 any attempt to use 
competition as a value for Constitutional adjudication faces a nearly opposite problem.  
There are too many normative justifications for using competition rather than too few and 
the policies that flow from an embrace of one such justification conflict with those that 
would flow from the use of another.  
“Competitive” models of democracy are, generally speaking, of two types: the 
kind exemplified most clearly by Issacharoff and Pildes and the model associated with 
famed Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter. Issacharoff and Pildes state quite clearly 
what value they think a competitive party system should maximize.  “Only through an 
appropriately competitive partisan environment can one of the central goals of 
democratic politics be realized: that the policy outcomes of the political process be 
responsive to the interests and views of citizens.”30
28 See, e.g., Politics by Other Means, supra note _, at 1697; JUST ELECTIONS, supra note _, at 7-8, 167.
29
 Others have responded to these and other criticism of competitive democratic theory models clearly and 
decisively.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, 206-49 (2003); Adam 
Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, 23 in DEMOCRACY’S VALUE (Ian Shapiro 
and Cassiano Hacker-Cordon eds., 1999) (hereinafter “Minimalist Conception”).
30 See Politics as Markets, supra note 12, at 646.
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Schumpeter, on the other hand, cared little about the representativeness of 
government.31  Elections, he argued, were merely competitions between elites in order to 
control the machinery of the state.32  Voters did not have an interest in developing their 
capacity to discuss political issues, meaning that a government produced simply through 
their negotiations would not be competent; the capacity of individuals is merely to be 
able to determine their local interests and to determine whether the current government is 
meeting them.33  Voters, though, are intimately aware of their own situation and should 
be given the opportunity to use their vote merely as a vote of confidence in the current 
state of affairs.34  This requires major parties to be different from one another; otherwise, 
there can be no referendum on the current government and hence no retrospective voting.
Even individual voters did have an interest in thinking clearly about politics 
Schumpeter argued that negotiations among them about difficult issues in a mass society 
would lead to conflict.35  Once the problems of individual incentive to engage reasonably 
31
 “If results that prove in the long run satisfactory to the people at large are made the test of government 
for the people, then government by the people…would often fail to meet it.” Joseph Schumpeter, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 256 (1943).
32
 “To put it differently, we now take the view that the role of the people is to produce a government…And 
we define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” 
Id. at 269
33 See id. at 254-66. 
34
 “But since electorates normally do not control their political leaders in any way ecept by refusing to 
reelect them…it seems well to reduce our ideas about this control in the way indicated by our definition.” 
Id at 272.
35 Id. at 255-56.
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with politics are added to this natural conflict, people will disagree and disagree to an 
extent that would imperil the stability of the government and perhaps lead to revolt in 
times of crisis.36  What is necessary is an individual or party with decisive control over 
governmental decisions, checked, though, by the prospect of being thrown out of office in 
the next election (or by party revolt).  The key is the decisive control of the machinery of 
government – if it is clear who, by dint of majority election, is in power then the 
government can make decisions in response to external concerns and individuals will be 
less likely to dispute governmental decisions because they will clearly represent the 
mandate of the majority.37
Electoral competition in Schumpeter’s model, then, serves two purposes; it gives 
myopic voters clear, simple choices and provides society as a whole with clear result 
about who will constitute the government, thereby improving the functioning of 
government in times of stress and, perhaps most importantly, reducing the likelihood of 
revolt.
36
 “First, even if there were no political groups trying to influence him, the typical citizen would in political 
matters tend to yield to extra-rational or irrational prejudice and impulse…At certain junctures, this may 
prove fatal to his nation.” Id. at 262.
37
 “It is in fact obvious that proportional representation [which Schumpeter has noted is an effort to make 
elected officials representative of the opinions of the populace] will offer opportunities for all sorts of 
idiosyncrasies to assert themselves but also that it may prevent democracy from producing efficient 
governments and thus prove a danger in times of stress…. If acceptance of leadership is the true function of 
the electorate’s vote, the case for proportional representation collapses because its premises are no longer 
binding.  The principle of democracy then merely means that the reins of government should be handed to 
those who comman more support than do any of the competing individuals or teams.” Id at 272-73.
15
The simplest way to understand the connection between these two theories is to 
think of the Pildes and Issacharoff model as focusing on the way competition makes a 
democratic state more democratic, while Schumpeter’s ideas focus on the ways in which 
elite competition allows a democratic state to survive as a state.  Another way of thinking 
about this is to note that Issacharoff and Pildes have adopted an equilibrium approach to 
maximizing public satisfaction, arguing that laws that limit the extent to which 
government policy reflects the policy preferences of voters today, while the 
Schumpeterian method is dynamic, trying to maximize satisfaction over time, assuming 
that no one (or, at least, very few people) prefers to have their short-term lack of 
knowledge translated into governmental policy or societal strife created by unclear 
electoral results.   This type of dispute is directly analogous to one of the crucial debates 
in antitrust law, where Schumpeter himself (he was primarily an economist) claimed that 
maximizing short-term efficiency harmed the incentive to create new ideas (or to engage 
in “creative destruction”).38
38
 “To summarize somewhat brutally, Schumpeter advanced three related principles concerning innovation: 
(1) capitalist economies are characterized by a continuous process of "creative destruction," in which 
innovative technologies and organizational structures constantly threaten the status quo; (2) technological 
innovation provides the opportunity for temporary monopoly profits, and the pursuit of these profits has 
spurred the tremendous growth of the Western economies; and (3) because of the expense of conducting 
research, large firms are necessary to keep the engine of capitalist change going. Therefore, despite its 
advantages in terms of short-term social welfare, an industry structure that encourages competition among 
many small firms is not the best structure for fostering technological innovation.” Robert P. Merges, 
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 805, 
843 (1988).  See also CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, at 81-103.  This has been 
seen as one of the most important questions facing antitrust law and its interface with patent law.  Michael 
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Current Supreme Court doctrine in election law strikes a balance between the 
positive and negative, static and dynamic efficiency.39  The first way it does this is laid 
out above; by defining rights in a way consistent with natural duopoly competition (or 
rather, by protecting the component parts of natural duopoly competition) the Court 
allows states to promote an electoral system that naturally respects the two 
Schumpeterian constraints.  FPTP/single district elections tend to promote a two-party 
system and therefore clear choices for voters and clear winners and losers in elections.  
Beyond this, the Court has given states the ability to justify regulations that impinge on 
the component parts of natural duopoly competition if the state interests are strong and 
legitimate and the regulation is necessary to vindicate these interests.40 The interests that 
A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761 (2002).  Determining whether 
and under what circumstances permitting monopolies to function improves innovation is a long-running 
and unresolved debate among antitrust economists.  “Schumpeter's insights began a debate that has never 
ended over the relationship between large firm size and innovation, or between monopoly power and the 
rate of innovation.” Herbert Hovankamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust, 1995 Colum. Bus. L. Rev 
1, 23 (1995).  The belief that dynamic efficiency gains of monopoly mean that courts should only use 
antitrust laws to limit the most egregious monopolies is most associated with Frank Easterbrook. See, e.g., 
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 15-16 (1984)
39
 Whether antitrust law strikes a reasonable balance between dynamic and static efficiency is matter of 
some contention.  See Carrier, supra note _, at 811-12 (“Courts today begin and end their antitrust 
examination with economic analysis. Of the economic efficiencies, courts have focused primarily on 
allocative efficiency - the optimal allocation of goods and services to consumers. Courts therefore have 
analyzed the effect of challenged practices on price or output in the relevant markets.  But courts also have 
analyzed innovative efficiencies.”)
40
 “Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State's election laws therefore cannot be resolved 
by any ‘litmus paper test’ that will separate valid from invalid restrictions…. Instead, a court must resolve 
17
the Court has found to be even potential justification for burdening electoral rights have 
been those that promote decisive results and clear choices for voters.41  If there is a 
fundamental conflict between representative and Schumpeterian values, the Court is left 
to weigh the relative harms.  This is not a solution to the fundamentally moral question 
about the relative value of representation and stability,42 but it does limit the grounds on 
which such a decision can be made.  Further, it lays out the possible justifications and 
factual predicates for deciding that one or another of these values should win out.  This is 
the most one can expect of doctrine – it limits but does not remove the necessity of 
judicial judgment – and therefore is a reasonable approach to an irresolvable conflict.
c) Combining the Two Critiques: Politics as Markets Redeemed
such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation. It must first consider 
the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put 
forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court 
must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the 
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all 
these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is 
unconstitutional.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (citations excluded)..
41
 “States certainly have an interest in protecting the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of their ballots and 
election processes as means for electing public officials….States also have a strong interest in the stability 
of their political systems.” Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364, 366.
42
 Richard Posner has argued that a court cannot, in the end, rely on moral argument to create firm doctrine 
when moral claims are contested.  RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL 
THEORY 109-15 (1999).  Even if one does not accept Posner’s claim that moral argument can never serve to 
guide adjudication, in this case wisdom seems to lay on the side of not solving rather than solving this 
moral dilemma.
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This paper, then, consists of two, interlocking arguments.  The first is that the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights the Supreme Court has decided to recognize in 
the field of election law are consistent with a “natural duopoly” regulation, and that this 
promotes representative government given the structural features of the American 
electoral system.  The second is that the test the Court has used in these cases – one that 
promotes duopoly competition but permits states to impose regulations that burden the 
component parts of competition if they are necessary to promote clear choices for voters 
or decisive election results – provides a fair, reasonable metric by which fundamental 
differences about the nature of democracy can be resolved.  Thus, though it has not made 
itself perfectly clear on this score, the Supreme Court created a jurisprudential scheme 
that nearly optimally marries the two conflicting normative justifications for electoral 
competition.
In his insighful dissent in Vieth v. Jubelier, Justice Breyer made clear that the 
Supreme Court shared this vision of its role:
“There must also be a method for transforming the will of the majority into 
effective government.  This Court has explained that political parties play a 
necessary role in that transformation. At a minimum, they help voters assign 
responsibility for current circumstances, thereby enabling those voters, through 
their votes for individual candidates, to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the political status quo. Those voters can either vote to support that status quo or 
vote to "throw the rascals out." …. A party-based political system that satisfies this 
minimal condition encourages democratic responsibility. It facilitates the 
transformation of the voters' will into a government that reflects that will.”
“[O]ne should begin by asking why single-member electoral districts are the norm, 
why the Constitution does not insist that the membership of legislatures better 
reflect different political views held by different groups of voters. History, of 
course, is part of the answer, but it does not tell the entire story. The answer also 
lies in the fact that a single-member-district system helps to assure certain 
democratic objectives better than many ‘more representative’ (i.e., proportional) 
electoral systems. Of course, single-member districts mean that only parties with 
candidates who finish "first past the post" will elect legislators. That fact means in 
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turn that a party with a bare majority of votes or even a plurality of votes will often 
obtain a large legislative majority, perhaps freezing out smaller parties. But single-
member districts thereby diminish the need for coalition governments. And that
fact makes it easier for voters to identify which party is responsible for government 
decisionmaking (and which rascals to throw out), while simultaneously providing 
greater legislative stability.”43
Breyer endorsed a view that the Constitution prohibits state laws that impair the single-
member district system from producing decisive electoral results, easy distinctions 
between the parties and competition between the major parties.   Though this was a 
dissent, this remains the best definition of what current Supreme Court doctrine is in the 
area of election law.  This paper stands as an explanation and defense of this 
understanding of the Constitution’s role in elections.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows: Section II will examine the 
justifications inside democratic theory for privileging competition as a constitutional 
value and explain how the Supreme Court has succeeded in coming up with a metric for 
weighing conflicting justifications.  Section III will show how incorporating natural 
monopoly theory would improve the idea of electoral markets; Section IV will survey the 
state of primary ballot access law and argue that it is largely consistent with existing 
ideas about optimal regulation under natural duopoly conditions; Section V serves as a 
brief conclusion.  
II. Two Theories of “Competitive Democracy” 
43 Vieth v. Jubelier, 124 S. Ct. 1822-25 (2004) (Breyer J.,  dissenting).
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When contrasted with “deliberative” or “participatory” models of democracy, 
“competitive” models are usually treated as being of a type. 44   This rhetorical move 
groups together all theorists who rely on the analogy between markets and politics and 
view elections through the lens of competition between candidates for votes rather than 
as a discussion between voters on how to best make decisions.  However, such a move 
masks deep divisions among the theoretical justifications for valuing competition.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of competitive models: (1) those that focus 
on maximizing the extent to which electoral outcomes are representative of the opinions 
of voters and (2) those, like Joseph Schumpeter’s, that support competition because it 
promotes clear choices for voters and decisive electoral outcomes and therefore reduces 
societal conflict.  The policies that believers of either of these models support inevitably 
conflict – the system of election laws that produce the most representative legislature 
would not necessarily produce decisive results and vice versa.
An examination of these two models shows that it is impossible to determine 
theoretically which is more important for a democracy.  Yet conflicts persist and must be 
solved.  The Supreme Court has solved this problem as well as it could possibly be 
expected to, by reducing this theoretical conflict to a factual one.  It defines associational 
rights in the electoral context in such a way that states are not allowed to engage in 
regulation that harms the component parts of the type of competition that promotes 
representative outcomes in a FPTP system, unless their regulations are enacted to ensure 
44 See, e.g., LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, 166-69 (discussing “Concept 2” 
democracy, a model that combines Schumpeter and theories based on the importance of representation); 
Bruce Cain, Party Autonomy and Two-Party Electoral Competition, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793, 794 (2001) 
(grouping together Robert Dahl, Anthony Downs and Schumpeter).
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decisive outcomes and clear choices for voters.  If these regulations are enacted for these 
purposes, the Court weighs the effect of the regulation along these axes and determines 
which is more significantly harmed.
Thus, while in extreme cases the Court would be forced to choose between the 
two concepts of competition, the jurisprudence has reduced the type of arguments that 
can justify restrictive electoral regulations and provided a set of factual predicates on 
which an ultimate decision-maker could base her decision.  In contested matters, this is 
the best doctrine can achieve and the Supreme Court’s electoral jurisprudence should 
therefore be considered a success.
Arguing for the essential reasonability of the Supreme Court’s approach to 
resolving conflicts between the two basic competitive models requires, as a first step, 
laying out both of the models.  This will be followed by a discussion of the jurisprudence 
in the language of the models.    
A. Competition and Representativeness: 
In contemporary legal literature, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have 
created one of the most complete models for the examination of elections laws.45  In 
“Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process,” they argue that the 
best way to judge election laws is to determine how representative the elected are of the 
preferences of the electorate.46  This is analogous to the question we ask of markets, 
namely whether they are operating efficiently.  Constitutional review of election laws 
45 See Politics as Markets, supra note _, at 643.  
46
 “Only through an appropriately competitive partisan environment can one of the central goals of 
democratic politics be realized: that the policy outcomes of the political process be responsive to the 
interests and views of citizens.” Id. at 646.
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should exist to fix any market failures.47  The particular failure Issacharoff and Pildes 
were worried about was the way in which elected officials, as members of parties, create 
rules that favor the existing parties and hence violate the efficiency of the electoral 
market.
Although relatively simple, the model has proved remarkably robust, providing 
analytical insight on issues as distinct as gerrymandering, blanket primaries, fusion 
candidacies and campaign finance.48  One of the reasons for its success is its parsimony; 
it proposes that courts use one value, competition, rather than a complex mélange of 
interests, as a guide to deciding all election law cases.
Competition, though, is a means and not an end.  The reason for valuing party 
competition, in Issacharoff and Pildes’s view, is that it produces governmental policy-
making that is responsive to the preferences of voters.49  This concept draws heavily upon 
the work of political scientists working in a public choice idiom.  Specifically, it is based 
on a vision of political party behavior most famously seen in the work of Anthony 
47
 “But politics shares with all markets a vulnerability to anticompetitive behavior… Where there is an 
appropriately robust market in partisan competition, there is less justification for judicial intervention. 
Where courts can discern that existing partisan forces have manipulated these background rules, courts 
should strike down those manipulations in order to ensure an appropriately competitive partisan 
environment.”  Id. at 646, 648.
48 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Why Elections?, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 684, 687 (2003) (applying the Politics 
as Markets hypothesis to gerrymandering); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: 
Political Parties, Associational Freedoms and Partisan Competition, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 274, 276 (2001) 
(Hereinafter “Private Parties”) (blanket primaries); Politics as Markets, supra note 12, at 683-91 (fusion 
and campaign finance laws).
49 See Politics as Markets, supra note 12, at 646.
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Downs, who saw parties as rational actors with the sole goal of maximizing their vote 
totals.50  Downs surmised that parties would change their policies in order to maximize 
their vote, much like firms operating in a consumer market tailor their goods to the tastes 
of consumers.  For example, businesses locating themselves along a street will space 
themselves differently based on the number of competing stores in order to gain 
competitive advantage by reducing the transportation costs of consumers located along 
the street.51  Imagine a street with only one store: it would open shop in the middle of the 
street to make it easier for all customers to reach it.  If another firm decided to open on 
the street, it would logically locate directly next door to the existing store, giving it an 
advantage with exactly half the customers – those that are closer to it than they are to the 
old store.52
This, according to Downs, is what happens with parties.  Assuming voters are 
arrayed along an ideological spectrum, two political parties will propose nearly identical 
platforms, vying for the median voter.53  The party that gets the median voter will 
presumably win all voters to her right/left (depending on which party it is.)  Public policy 
is hence what voters in the middle of the spectrum want.
50 See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, 114-16 (1957); Private Parties, supra
note 30, at 300 (“As set out initially in the work of Anthony Downs, we may follow the spatial model of 
how…a party seeking an advantageous position among a heterogeneous electorate … would gravitate 
toward the center so as to position himself or herself in proximity to the preferences of the greatest number 
of voters.”).
51 See Downs, supra note __, at 117; Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 Econ. J. 41 (1929)
52 See Hotelling, supra note _, at 41. 
53 See Downs, supra note _, at 115-17.
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This view of parties and of the electorate is admittedly simplistic, but it is still a 
reasonable assumption that competition between political parties forces elected officials 
to at least attempt to generate policies that represent the preferences of the electorate.54
Issacharoff and Pildes want to make sure that elected officials are responsive to these 
pressures and are not able to insulate themselves from this competitive pressure by 
passing laws that ensure electoral success.55  Removing such anti-competitive laws will 
result in more representative policies because it will force the parties to compete more 
vigorously for the median voter – just like the two businesses that end up side-by- side on 
a strip.
What should be noted is that this is an equilibrium or static model; that is, it seeks 
to make each election produce a government that is as responsive as possible to the 
preferences of voters.  As will be seen below, the weight of Schumpeter’s critique of both 
market anti-trust laws and democratic systems, springs from his argument that markets 
and democratic systems need to be understood dynamically, or over a number of periods 
(elections) because attempting to produce the most efficient outcome in each and every 
period does not necessarily produce the most efficient outcome over time.56
54 But see Entrenching the Duopoly, supra note _, at 721 n.13 (discussing the work of political scientists 
who have criticized the median voter hypothesis).
55 See Politics as Markets, supra note _, at 647.
56
 Schumpeter model is often mistaken for focusing on equilibrium concerns.  See JOHN MEDEARIS, JOSEPH 
SCHUMPETER’S TWO THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY 178-82 (2001) (discussing how political scientists have 
misunderstood Schumpeter as having created an equilibrium model).  The reason he has been 
misunderstood is that his was the first real model of competitive democracy and the economist/political 
scientists who adopted a competitive framework were working in a neo-classical economic milieu.  While 
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That said, the general concept of producing a government that acts like the people 
would like it to is a basic value of democracy, and in the popular conception, perhaps the 
only value.57
B. Schumpeter’s Competitive Vision
For a theorist of democracy, Joseph Schumpeter cared little for the opinions of the 
demos.  In his most famous work, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter 
laid out what he argued was a positive description of what democratic states really are 
like, and in this vision, the opinions of voters about individual policies played little role.  
Rather than being a system by which the people, with opinions on the issues of the day, 
chose leaders to express and enact those preferences, “the democratic method is that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire 
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”58 Elected 
officials enact policies then look to the populace for sanction based on their effect; their 
opposition claims that these policies were ineffective and that there are better 
alternatives.   Effective elections, under this understanding, are not those that accurately 
translate the pre-existing preferences of the populace into policies – Schumpeter, rejected 
the idea that the populace had meaningful preferences59 – but rather those that give voters 
clear choices and produce decisive results, because such decisive results make it easier 
Issacharoff and Pildes are an heir to this intellectual tradition, it is notably not consistent with Schumpeter’s 
own ideas.
57 See Minimalist Conception, supra note _, at 32 (“’[R]epresentation, or its cognates, is frequently treated 
as quintessential, if not definitional, for democracy.”) 
58 See CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, at 269.
59 Id. at 270 (“Collectives act almost exclusively by accepting leadership.”)
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for governmental officials to enact a program that can then be judged by the electorate.  
Perhaps more importantly, decisive electoral results reduce societal conflict, because it is 
clear to losers that a majority of their peers disagree with them, and produce governments 
solid enough to survive internal conflict and external crises. 
While Schumpeter claimed his ideas were merely positive description,60 it is 
important to see that, while this was not, broadly speaking, a falsehood, his model does 
contain powerful normative ideas.  The reason for this apparent contradiction is that his 
ideas relate to the question of how a democratic state can survive.  Schumpeter believed 
his “thin” conception of democracy, as opposed to those that rely heavily on “thicker” 
ideas about complex mass deliberation, was the only one that produced governments able 
to survive crises and reduce societal conflict to a tolerable level.61  Therefore it stood as a 
positive description of existing mass democratic states that they were, in fact, behaving as 
Schumpeter claimed they were because if they did not, they would not exist (or would 
move to a system based on a thinner conception of democracy).  Thus, though it was, in 
his mind, descriptive, Schumpeter was actually arguing that a certain conception of 
democracy increased the likelihood of state survival and was, when the problems of mass 
60
 “Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political – legislative and administrative—decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself, 
irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given historical conditions.” CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM 
AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, at 242.
61
 Id. at 252-62; For a modern day Schumpeterian’s argument that the strongest justification for democracy 
is its ability to reduce societal conflict and the possibility of revolution, see Minimialist Conception, supra 
note _, at 48-49.
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decision-making in nations featuring severe disagreements among its people and external 
pressures were taken into account, the only real choice for modern democracies.62
This distinction between modern, mass democracies, which feature conflict 
between its citizens and no meaningful way of mediating these differences through 
deliberation, and democracies in homogenous, small nations, where these are not serious 
problems, is crucial to understanding Schumpeter’s rejection of “classical” theories of 
democracy.63  His argument against such earlier conceptions was that they misunderstood 
the difficulty of aggregating preferences and translating that into public policy.   “There 
is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree 
on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument.” 64 The idea of a common 
good, a best set of government policies, that can be generated out of negotiations and 
62
 Schumpeter argued that the “classical doctrine” of democracy, rooted in an opposite conception of 
democracy, did describe some political communities.  “[I]t must not be forgotten that there are social 
patterns in which the classical doctrine will fit facts with a sufficient degree of approximation.  As has been 
pointed out, this is the cse with many small and primitive societies which as a matter of fact served as a 
prototype to the authors of that doctrine.  It may be the case also with societies that are not primitive 
provided they are not too differentiated and do not harbor any serious problems.  Switizerland is the best 
example.  There is so little to quarrel about in a world of peasants, which, excepting hotels and banks, 
contains no great capitalist industry, and the problems of public policy are so simple and so stable that an 
overwhelming majority can be expected to understand them and agree about them.  But if we can conclude 
that in such cases the classical doctrine approximates reality we have to add immediately that it does so not 
because it describes an effective mechanism of political decision but only because there are no great 
decisions to be made.” Id. at 267.
63 Id. at 250-68.
64 Id. at 251.
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discussions between the people is a fiction, except perhaps in a small New England town 
where disagreements can be hashed out in town hall.65  In a large heterogeneous society, 
people disagree about what is good and, even where they agree about a metric for what is 
good, disagree about which policies will best produce that good, and disagree to the 
extent that mere argument is unlikely to get them to resolve their disagreements.66
Further, in a mass rather than a small society, people have little reason to understand the 
complex issues of governance, making broad societal agreement about either means or 
ends even more difficult.67  Support for democracy cannot be based on the belief that 
such an agreement will occur; rather, democracy exists as a political method to produce 
workable policies despite the existence of such disagreement.
In his crucial if flawed book “Joseph Schumpeter’s Two Theories of Democracy,” 
John Medearis misses this point.68  He argues that Schumpeter’s career and earlier 
writings reveal that he really believed that democratic deliberation and education had a 
transformative effect on citizens and could serve to convince people who otherwise 
would disagree to come to common answers about contested questions in certain areas.69
In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter rejected that agreement could ever 
65 Id. at 246.
66
 “Americans who say, ‘We want this country to arm to its teeth and then to fight for what we conceive to 
be right all over the globe’ and Americans who say, ‘We want this country to work out its own problems 
which is the only way it can serve humanity” are facing irreducible differences of ultimate values which 
compromise could only maim and degrade.” Id. at 251.
67 Id. at 256-64.
68 See Medearis, supra note _, at 1.
69 Id. at 57-64
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be found on political issues in a modern democratic state.  In Medearis’s view, the reason 
for this apparent contradiction was ideological.70  Uncomfortable with the potential 
radical results of expanded democracy, Schumpeter created an elite conception of 
democracy as a method in order to blunt the tendencies towards the extreme versions of 
socialism he thought were the likely outcome of democratic methods.71
This view fails to understand Schumpeter’s work in the context of explaining 
modern mass democracies.  To understand why, it is necessary to explain exactly what 
assumptions Schumpter made and did not make about the behavior of voters when 
making political decisions.  In his section “Human Nature in Politics,” Schumpter makes 
heavy use of famed “mob” theorists Pareto and Le Bon.72   They argued that men were 
far from rational, but rather prone to irrational group behavior.   Schumpeter concluded 
“the electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede.” 73
The key to Schumpeter’s reading of these writers, though, is that he thought them 
insightful but not absolutely correct. Le Bon, he noted, “overstress[es] the realities of 
human behavior.”74  Human beings do not, after all, always act as crazed mobs.  
70
 “To put this differently…the only reason he could have to insist on the elite assumptions about human 
nature he chose was to preclude the kind of spread of democratic practices proponents of developmental 
theories would favor.” Id. at 133
71
 “But the full import of his elite conception of democracy is best understood in light of the deeply 
authoritarian picture he drew of democratic socialism.  While this was by no means a picture of 
Schumpeter’s idea society, it was his version of a society in which elite rule and convservative values could 
persist despite the tendencies leading toward socialism.” Id. at 139.
72 See CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, at 256-64.
73 Id. at 283 (emphasis mine).
74 Id. at 257.
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Medearis places a great deal of weight on the small passage in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy where Schumpeter limits his reliance on the mob theorists.75  In this passage, 
Schumpeter claims that individual citizens can act rationally and without the “irrational 
prejudice and impulse;” when making decisions about “himself, his family, his business 
dealings, his hobbies, his friends and enemies, his township and ward, his class, church, 
trade union or any other social group of which he is an active member – the things under 
his personal observations, the things which are familiar to him independently of what his 
newspaper tells him.”76   This is, in Medearis’s view, an enormous concession to 
“theorists of democracy who have stressed the importance of developing the capacity for 
democratic participation” because, if one believes that citizens could develop the capacity 
to make rational choices about their trade union or social group, then, if given the 
opportunity, citizens are, in fact, capable of developing the capacity to engage in 
decision-making about national affairs.77
Schumpeter did reply to this critique, making a sharp distinction between those 
things that people can know about (matters close to home) and those they could not, like 
political affairs.  Medearis calls this “deeply dissatisfying,” but only because he 
misunderstands the point.78  Schumpeter was an unconventional economist, to be sure, 
but an economist all the same79 and his belief that people were able to develop the 
75
 See Medearis, supra note _, at 120-33. 
76 Id. at 258-59.
77
 Medearis, supra note _, at 120 
78
 Id. at 121.
79
 “Schumpeter was a great economist; and though his theory of democracy is not formally economic, it 
bears the stamp of his profession.” LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, at 188.
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capacity to make decisions (through repetition) about their everyday life was rooted very 
firmly in his belief that it is in their interest to act rationally in those fields.  
Normally, the great political questions take their place in the psychic economy of 
the typical citizen with those leisure-hour interests that have not attainted the rank 
of hobbies , and with the subjects of irresponsible conversation.  These things seem 
so far off; they are not at all like a business propositions: dangers may not 
materialize at all and if they should they may not prove so very serious; one feels 
oneself to be moving in a fictious world.  This reduced sense of reality accounts not 
only for a reduced sense of responsibility but also for the absence of effective 
volition….. All of this goes to show that without the initiative that comes from 
immediate responsibility, ignorance will persist in the face of masses of 
information however complete or correct.80
The assumption he makes about human nature here is not radical; he merely claims that 
people are better at solving easier questions than they are at hard ones and are more likely 
to be good at solving questions that are important for them (on a personal level) to solve. 
In economic terms, he is arguing that learning how to make good political decisions is a 
public good, with a positive net benefit for society but where no individual has the 
incentives to bear his or her share of the costs.  Schumpeter believed that average citizens 
had little reason to develop the capacity to think about the big issues facing a nation and, 
as such, the people (rather than people) could not make anything other than uninformed, 
irrational decisions about policy.81  Moreover, issues important to the state generally will 
never have the level of independent importance to individuals that their work and 
families will because their share of the benefits will be low as will their share of the 
80 CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, at 261-62.
81
 “Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the 
political field.” Id. at 262. 
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costs.82  The capacity of individuals is, for the most part, unimportant – even if certain 
people have the ability to learn how to make such decisions, the people as a whole (“the 
electoral mass”) have no such capacity because it will never be in the interest of any one 
of them (except those who run for office and hence receive the perks of office) to develop 
it.   For Medearis, this is a limit of democratic planning, because democratic systems 
ought to be designed such that people develop their capacity to make decisions.83
Schumpeter believed that democratic systems in massive, modern democracies could not 
be developed in such a way because of the inevitable difference in interest for almost all 
citizens between making local decisions that affect them directly and high political 
decisions that affect them at a level of remove. 
Medearis’s misunderstanding of the distinction between the ability of people and 
the ability of the people, or the electoral mass, in Schumpeter’s work is central to his 
claim that Schumpeter was really a transformative theorist. Schumpeter notably thought 
of politicians as “entreprenural innovators” who “create new combinations, innovative 
party programs and platforms that exploit long-standing political opportunities and unmet 
preferences and needs.”84 Medearis responds to this by asking “why should we suppose 
that only elite professional politicians can engage in this sort of innovation?”85  The short 
82
 “However, when we move still farther away from the private concerns of the family and the business 
office into those regions of national and international affairs that lack a direct and unmistakable link with
those private concerns, individual volition, command of facts and method of inferene soon cease to fulfill 
the requirements of the classical doctrine.” Id. at 261.
83
 Medearis, supra note _, at 133.
84
 Medearis, supra note _ at 180-81 (recounting Schumpeter’s beliefs about political entrepreneurs).
85 Id.  at 182. 
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answer is that we do not (or, rather, Schumpeter does not). Schumpeter did not define 
“elites” to only include a small class of people but rather all people who try to run for 
office.  It is an empirical observation (and one that holds up under many different 
political systems) that this is a small fraction of the population.   The analogy holds: Only 
a few people, a small percentage of the population, are entrepreneurs.  The issue is not 
whether anyone has the ability to start a successful firm, since clearly someone can.   
Acknowledging this does not mean that everyone is capable or has an interest in coming 
up with innovative ideas for products and services that others will want to buy.  
Similarly, the question is not whether people have the ability to deliberate on political 
issues, as clearly some do, but rather whether the people can do so on a mass scale.  
Schumpeter argued that they cannot.
Moreover, he argued it would be dangerous if they did.  Mass decision-making, 
unimpeded by elite competition, could in Schumpeter’s model, lead to state collapse.  
Because he did not believe in a stable, easily identifiable social consensus along the lines 
of Rousseau, he believed that interference with a competitive model that produced 
decisive results would lead to conflict and potentially state collapse.
Schumpeter wrote a review of F.A. Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom that makes this 
view clear.86  He claimed that “the book, for a political book, takes surprisingly little 
account of the political structures of our time.”87  While he, like Hayek, hated socialism, 
in this article Schumpeter praises the English conservatives who had embraced part of a 
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socialist agenda (and were criticized by Hayek).88 His argument, contra Hayek’s 
libertarian claim that socialism and democracy are incompatible, was that the drive 
towards some type of democratic socialism was inevitable and that it was important for 
elites to control the situation to avoid social collapse.  Medearis writes “the point was to 
understand those tendencies and theorize a form of democratic socialism that would still 
be consistent with Schumpeter’s conservative values.”89  This is a mischaracterization: 
Schumpeter’s ‘conservative values’ were a belief that social structures needed to take 
certain forms in order to survive.  Medearis excoriates Schumpeter for embracing a 
conception of the democratic state that was, in his view, questionably democratic.  
Schumpeter focused on the other side of this: what makes democratic states – socialist or 
not – remain states.  It was his belief that the decisiveness of elite competition provided 
the means by which governments could be formed and decisions could be made inside a 
mass state where people disagreed with one another.
It is important, then, to return to his beliefs about how people and the people 
make their decisions.  The one crucial assumption in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy about individuals is not, as Medearis claims, that Schumpeter believed they 
cannot learn about issues if given incentives, but rather that, even after negotiation and 
thought, people are likely to disagree with one another. 
“[E]ven if the opinions and desires of individual citizens were perfectly definite and 
independent data for the democratic process to work with, and if everyone acted on 
them with ideal rationality and promptitude, it would not necessarily follow that the 
political decisions produced by that process from the raw material of those 
individual volitions would represent anything that could any convincing sense be 
called the will of the people.  It is not only conceivable but, whenever individual 
88 See Medearis, supra note _, at 102-04.
89 Id. at 104.
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wills are much divided, very likely that the political decisions produced will not 
conform to “what people really want.” If people were to deliberate and actively 
participate in politics, but were faced with both their limited capacity and the 
inevitability of conflicting.  Nor can it be replied that, if not exactly what they 
want, they will get a “fair compromise.” This may be so.  The chances for this to 
happen are greatest with those issues which are quantitative in nature or admit to 
gradation… But with qualitative issues, such as the question whether to persecutre 
heretics or to enter upon a war, the result attained may well, though for different 
reasons, be equally distasteful to all the people….[In such a situation] deadlock or 
interminable struggle, engendering increasing irritation, would have been the most 
probably outcome of any attempt to settle the question democratically.90
This is because people disagree with another about fundamental questions.  As noted 
above, Schumpeter claimed, “There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined 
common good that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of 
rational argument.   This is due not primarily to the fact that some people may want 
things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to 
different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things.”91
The key is that even rational argument or negotiation will not serve to produce solid 
outcomes.   
But a state needs to make choices in order to survive – it needs to make policies to 
produce security and economic welfare – and it needs to make choices in such a way that 
those choices are accepted (at least in the passive form of not being rebelled against) by 
the citizenry.  If the decision about who will make decisions is not clear, then there will 
be “deadlock and interminable struggle.”92  This is made worse by the problems of the 
mass state, in which people are not fully informed (and, as was noted above, have no 
90 CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note _, at 256.
91 Id. at 251.
92 Id. at 255.
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incentive to be). Who wins the struggle for office is less important than that someone 
wins clearly.  If election results are not decisive, then elections have failed to solve the 
problem of decision-making in a mass state and there will be continued conflict over 
policies.  
In ordinary times, perhaps, such indeciveness is not a problem.  Certain societies, 
including “small and primitive” ones, and nations that do not have existential crises to 
face, may feature enough agreement that clear electoral decisions are not necessary.93
However, in times of “stress,” the failure of a society to produce clear decisions could 
lead to revolution or external weakness.  The inherent conflict between the individual 
values means that some system must be devised whereby the choices of individuals are 
translated into clear, stable governments. 
This is why Schumpeter opposed proportional representation.  “It is in fact 
obvious not only that proportional representation will offer opportunities for all sorts of 
idiosyncrasies to assert themselves but also that it may prevent democracy from 
producing efficient governments and thus prove a danger in times of stress.”94
In contrast, in Schumpeter’s model, power resides entirely in the hands of the 
Prime Minister and his government, who, once selected, enjoy full power to make 
decisions until they are defeated (either by the parliament or in the next election).  This 
puts enormous power in the hands of one person, of course, but this was, for Schumpeter, 
both inevitable (because otherwise there would be disagreement) and agreeable, because 
it created incentives for creative leadership.
93 Id. at 267.
94 Id. at 272.
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In order to understand this last point, we have to turn towards Schumpeter’s 
economic theory.  Even more than his contributions to democratic theory, Schumpeter is 
known for his idea of “creative destruction.”95  His effective claim is that, were 
equilibrium models of competition accurate to reality, there would inevitably be 
economic stagnation.  This is because, in a competitive equilibrium, there are no profits –
competition has squeezed them out. As such, there are no resources to capture and to 
reinvest in the creation of new ideas.  This would ruin the central part of a capitalist 
economy: the creation of new ideas that will serve to destroy old forms of production.  
Fortunately, according to Schumpeter, actual competition does not produce equilibrium 
efficiency, but rather produces dynamic efficiency or is efficient over time.96
Competition between firms has winners and losers, with the winners in a monopoly like 
position and able to charge super-normal prices. Any effort to use governmental power to 
limit this monopoly power was misguided because, even if it did serve to create an 
economy that was more efficient today, it would not serve to create an overall more 
efficient economy because there would be less incentive to create.
Economists have debated endlessly whether such monopolistic power leads to 
more innovation or less.97  However, the connection between Schumpeter’s argument in 
favor of monopoly and his theory of democracy is clear.  An electoral system should 
produce decisive electoral results for the same reason it should produce decisive 
95 See Merges, supra note _, at 843. 
96 See Medearis, supra note _, at 150-52 (summarizing the claims of JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY 
OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS 
CYCLE (1911)).
97 See generally Herbert Hovankamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust, supra note _, 23.
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economic ones – it increases the stability and hence the desirability of winning.  The 
result should be better policies and a surer hand at the helm (because the competition for 
the position had been fierce) during times of stress.  
All of this leaves us with an important question; what role can Schumpeter’s 
model play in resolving constitutional problems dealing with election law.  From 
Schumpeter’s model, one can draw two major values that he thought were necessary for 
the maintaining a stable democracy: decisive electoral results and simple, binary choices 
for voters.  A Constitutional system that respected Schumpeterian principles would 
ensure that no electoral rules were passed that violated these conditions.  
c. Combining The Two Models: The Supreme Court’s Steady Hand
From these two discussions, it should be clear that the two models conflict both 
about the reasons for valuing political competition and about the rules by which that 
competition should be guided.  Without coming to some kind of accommodation (or the 
rejection of one side or the other) between Schumpeterian and equilibrium efficiency 
principles, competitive democratic theory cannot serve to help create a consistent 
jurisprudence.  
One way to approach this problem is to note the weakness of the idea that 
elections can ever truly be representative.  Political scientist Adam Przewroski adeptly 
makes this argument.98  He notes that there are two major problems with any attempt to 
justify the use of democratic methods because they produce representative government: 
(1) the citizenry may have no definite opinion about political issues and (2) may be poor 
judges of what is in their interest even when making determinations about whether a 
98 See Przeworski, supra note _, at 31-39, 46-50.
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politician has done well in office in the previous term.99  If people do not have a definite 
idea about what is in their interest, it becomes illogical to claim that elected officials can 
be representative of the desires of the electorate, because there is nothing they can be 
representative of.  If people are myopic, and are hence bad judges of what is in their long-
term interest, ex post evaluations (i.e. retrospective voting based on performance) also are 
flawed. 
Both of these assumptions about voters seem reasonable – voters have little 
interest in forming definite opinions about issues of the day and are often myopic.  Thus, 
the only way to determine if politicians act in the interests of voters is some outside 
standard – a determination based on some objective criteria.100  But there is no outside 
body to determine these criteria. “We will arrive at different judgments, for we are 
‘people,’ participants rather than impartial observers.”101
The combination of these problems leaves representation at a loss.  Unless the 
citizenry know what is good ex ante, or can figure out ex post that some performance was 
good, there is no way to judge whether a politician was representative of the people. 
Further, decisions made by any type of majority rule (at the level of elections or in the 
legislature) do not necessarily include the views of those who lose, leaving it unclear 
whether decisions are representative of the entirety population or some subset.102 If we 
cannot judge whether elections are representative, maximizing the extent to which they 
are representative seems foolhardy.
99 Id. at 32. 
100 Id. at 33.
101 Id. at 34.
102 Id. at 38-39.
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Przeworski moves from this dismissal to a defense of a Schumpeterian system.  
His normative starting point is that “we want to avoid bloodshed, resolving conflicts 
through violence.”103  He first argues that the possibility of being able to change 
governments through some means limits this type of violence.  This is because losers in 
any political contest will see the likelihood that they will win in the future. Therefore, 
even if they could gain in the short-term by revolting and, at some cost to themselves, 
prevail in the political contest, they will not revolt because they see the possibility of 
winning in the future.104  This condition is met by flipping a coin to decide political 
problems, though, and hardly justifies having a decision system based on voting.105
His second claim is more persuasive; he claims that voting constitutes “flexing 
muscles,” or that majority rule broadly though not specifically coincides with the ability 
of a majority to impose its beliefs on the minority through force.106  Put in simple terms, 
minorities accept majority rule through elections because they couldn’t upset it through 
violence. 
“If elections are a peaceful substitute for rebelling…it is because they inform 
everyone who would mutiny and against what.  They inform the losers – ‘here is 
the distribution of force: if you disobey the instructions conveyed by the results of 
the election, I will be more likely to beat you than you will be able to beat me in a 
violent confrontation’ – and the winners ‘if you do not hold elections again or if 
you grab too much, I will be able to put up a forbidding resistance.’”107
103 Id. at 45.
104 Id. at 45-46.
105 Id. at 47.
106 Id. at 47-49.
107
 Id. at 48.
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This, though, is a contingent claim.  Even if we ignore the problem that there is no 
particular reason to assume, a priori, that a majority is more likely to win in a violent 
confrontation than certain minorities,108 we are faced with the problem that we need only 
worry about differences that are so serious that people will revolt against them no matter 
what the result.  Institutional design should only respond to actual and not to theoretical 
problems and so it should only create systems that deal with this problem when it actually 
occurs.109
Przeworkski’s dismissal of representation is similarly contingent.  While people 
certainly do not have absolute views about all political issues, they certainly have some.  
Similarly, citizens may not be perfect judges of their long-term interests but they are not 
utterly incapable of making any such determinations.  Representation, as an absolute 
matter, may not be possible, but this does not mean that a limited conception of it is 
incoherent or false; it just is not perfect.  
108
 The likelihood of minority success in physical confrontation has even become a fixture in some quasi-
democratic states.  In Turkey, the military has intervened, mostly peacefully, overturning election results as 
recently as 1997, to preserve secularism.  See Patrick R. Hugg, The Republic of Turkey in Europe: 
Reconsidering the Luxembourg Exclusion, 23 Fordham Int’l L. J. 606 (2002)
109
 Przeworski is cognizant of this point.  “Elections alone are not sufficient for conflicts to be resolved 
through elections.…Thus, a minimalist conception of democracy does not alleviate the need for thinking 
about institutional design. In the end, the “quality of democracy,” to use the currently fashionable phrase, 
does matter for its very survival.  But my point is not that democracy can be, needs to be, improved, but 
that it would be worth defending even if it could not be.” Przeworski, supra note _, at 50.  Nothing here 
should be taken as critical of Przeworski’s work, which in this article and others, has served as an important 
inspiration for this paper.
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Thus, the Schumpeterian model and the representative model are similarly 
problematic and, as an objective theoretical matter, there is no way to reject one in favor 
of the other.  Fortunately, courts at least do not need to solve these questions in absolute, 
afactual manner.  They can solve problems as they come up.  Rather than attempting to 
choose one model or another and solving their conflict, a court can maintain their 
conflicting values and see, in certain cases, whether to favor representation as a value or 
whether the stability that comes as a result of decisive election results should be 
privileged.   In each case, facts can be developed to show how much representation will 
be harmed, and how democratic stability will be endangered, leaving a court with the 
proper information to engage in its ultimate task of judgment.  
The Supreme Court’s election law jurisprudence takes this approach; it maintains 
the conflict between the two models as a matter of doctrine.  To see whether state 
election laws are constitutional, it first asks whether they burden protected constitutional 
rights.110  This determination, as will be shown below, effectively amounts to a judgment 
about whether they impermissibly infringe on rights that are necessary component parts 
of the type of political competition that serves to produce representative outcomes.111
The Court determines whether these rights have been burden severely or not; that is, it 
weighs the harm to representation.  If there is any burden, a state must produce an interest 
that could justify this burden, but the strength of the interest that can justify a burden 
varies with the weight of the burden. The interests that the Court has recognized as 
110
 This test was first used in Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, and best fleshed out in Timmons, Timmons, 520 
U.S. at 359.
111 See notes _ and accompanying text.
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potentially justifying burdens are those inherent in the Schumpeterian model: ensuring 
clear choices for voters and decisive results in elections.112  The Court then decides 
whether the interest justifies the burden.
This approach does not solve the problem created by the two conflicting 
justifications for valuing political competition, as it leaves the final determination to the 
Court with little guidance about which should win when the interests conflict.  However, 
by reducing the matter to facts and permissible arguments, the approach does create some 
degree of predictability and fairness.  Parties know what types of claims to bring and 
states know they are limited to only a narrow set of justifications for restricting political 
liberties.  Further, the doctrine limits the arbitrariness of judicial decisions in this area –
they must justify their decisions with a type of argument that has theoretical justification.   
Without some greater guidance about how to resolve fundamental conflicts of this type 
(and it is unclear from where this could come), this is the best one can expect.
America’s peculiar history has given the Court some help.  For much of American 
history, the United States has used a single-member district/FPTP electoral system in all 
Congressional races and in most legislative races throughout the country.113 As even the 
avatars of representation argue, this is a permanent feature of American elections and, 
because of their long-standing use, one that the Constitution should not be used to 
112 See notes _ and accompanying text.
113
 Congress first required single-member districts in 1842, repealed it in 1929 and reinstated it 1967.  The 
alternative was never proportional representation, but instead state-wide at-large elections. Richard Pildes 
and Kristin A. Donahue, Cummulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U Chi Legal F 241 251 n. 43 
(1995); James Gardner, Madison’s Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of Electoral Systems, 86 
Iowa L. Rev. 87, 90-91 (2000).
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upset.114 The next section of this paper will argue that, under this constraint, the results 
that promote representative outcomes also often serve Schumpeterian ends.  
III. Politics as Imperfect Markets: Regulation under Natural Duopoly Conditions
While theorists have disputed both the merits of both the simple 
“representativeness” metric and Schumpeter’s competitive democratic framework, 
Issacharoff and Pildes have been subject to other lines of attack as well.  Most important 
among these is that their theory is not rooted at all in the Constitution and that it fails to 
comprehensively deal with the implications of the market metaphor.115
Issacharoff and Pildes oppose a rights-based view of electoral systems.  Such a 
view has led, they argue, to a sterile constitutional discourse in which the deeper theories 
of democracy embedded in judicial decisions are selected ad hoc.116  Since the 
Constitution protects rights and does not speak much to the structural needs of 
114 See Politics as Markets, supra note _, at 677.
115See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial 
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protection Gerrymanders, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 649, 653  (“Most would criticize 
Issacharoff's argument…on the grounds that it is completely disconnected from the text of the 
Constitution.”)
116 Politics as Markets, supra note 12, at 646 (“[T]he failures of current doctrinal frameworks are not 
limited to the artificial narrowness of the rights-versus-state-interest formula. For in organizing an 
overview of judicial approaches to evaluating the political process, we have become more acutely aware 
that the Court's electoral jurisprudence lacks any underlying vision of democratic politics that is 
normatively robust or realistically sophisticated about actual political practices. [W]e increasingly see the 
images of democratic politics that underlie the Court's decisions as simply ad hoc - different views of the 
point of politics emerge almost at random as the Court confronts questions that range from patronage to 
redistricting to restructurings of the political process through voter initiatives.”).
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democracy, charges of atextualism are not wrong, but they are not, in the end, important 
either. Issacharoff and Pildes intended to create a theoretically firm concept of democracy 
that can serve as a way to interpret rights clauses in the Constitution.  Issacharoff has 
argued:
“There is no narrow textual justification for almost any of the body of law 
governing the political process…. It is difficult to see the gain from making 
believe that the need to fill in the gaps in an aging Constitution is anything other 
than a response to our experience with democratic governance.  There is 
certainly no gain in pretending that the answers to the questions of how to make 
democracy work are compelled by vague terms such as "due process," "equal 
protection," or "republican form of government." The same theoretical work 
would have to be done to make concrete the democratic values to be read into 
these open-textured clauses. Sometimes it is simply best to tell poor Virginia the 
sad truth: sorry, there really is no Santa Claus.”117
This is right; in almost all election law cases, a number of individuals and groups –
political party organizations, individual party members, states, minority voters – have 
Constitutional rights claims.  Engaging in Constitutional review in this field must by 
necessity privilege some theory; underlying the choice and application of types of 
scrutiny must be a metric by which courts can weigh the variety of valid claims brought 
before them.118  Moreover, though a variety of scholars have argued that, even if it is not 
directly rooted in constitutional text, election laws should be built around a system of 
individual rights,119 such a jurisprudence would fail to deal with the problems at the heart 
117
 See Why Elections?, supra note 32, at 687-88.
118 See Gerken, One Person, One Vote, supra note 11, at 1434.
119
 This is an enormous and rather constant debate in the election law literature.  Rather than engaging with 
this literature, though, I am simply taking one side – the “structuralist” position advocated by Pildes, 
Issacharoff and others.  See Politics as Markets, supra note __, at 645 (“At one level, the focus on rights 
poorly explains the nature of vote dilution claims, in which individuals can only show harm as part of an 
aggregate entity. Thus, in this area we have written critically of both the limited relevance of individualistic 
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of the Constitutional regulation of elections.  As Heather Gerken argues, “The salience of 
political structures and groups to voting claims makes it difficult to fit them into a 
conventional individual rights framework.”120
 The Supreme Court has declared that competition is a value inherent in many of 
these claims: “Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our 
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.”121  Issacharoff and Pildes argue 
that a decision by the Supreme Court to privilege this value consistently over others 
would create a more coherent (and better) jurisprudence.  As Pildes wrote in his article, 
The Theory of Political Competition, “Samuel Issacharoff and I attempt to make these 
ideas concrete by developing one structural aim that the history of American law and 
democracy suggests should be a particular focal point for courts.  This aim is the 
assurance of an appropriately competitive partisan political environment, or, to put it 
more accurately, the assurance that "artificial" barriers to robust partisan competition not 
claims and the difficulty in resting standing to sue on traditional, individualistic conceptions of harm. At 
another level, the conventional taxonomy of state interests relevant to regulating politics is too narrow to 
capture the range of considerations the courts actually take into account. Thus, in these areas we have 
argued that constitutional doctrine is also concerned with "expressive harms" that can result from the values 
the state expresses when it structures democratic institutions. These are not the conventional harms of 
constitutional doctrine in other fields, but we have suggested that special concerns for the content of the 
political culture seem to emerge from Supreme Court decisions that address the proper construction of 
democratic politics.”)
120 See Gerken, One Person, One Vote, supra note __, at 1448.  See also Heather K. Gerken, Understanding 
the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1663, 1671-72 (2001).  Pildes and Issacharoff are 
similarly clear 
121 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)
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be permitted.”122  As noted above, this process-based solution has as normative backing 
the goal of ensuring that elected officials are as representative of the opinions and 
interests of voters as possible.  Moreover, this is one instance in which the Supreme 
Court is not faced with a “counter-majoritarian” difficulty; rather than frustrating 
democratic will, it is serving to enhance it.123
While the “politics as markets” theory is proposed as a coherent alternative to 
current ad hoc decision-making, it suffers from internal flaws.  The largest of these is that 
it fails to respond adequately to the problem caused by Duverger’s Law.124  As noted 
122
 Richard Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1609 (1999)
123 See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491 
(1997); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).  This is a 
persuasive claim and is at the heart of one side of the debate about the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”  It 
is also a claim that maps nicely onto the Schumpeterian conditions suggested in this paper.  If it is true that 
courts are the only actors that can police political competition, it is also true that they are the actors least 
likely to care about the specific outcomes of elections (and the trappings of power that come with them) 
and be in a position to protect political stability from myopic, self-interested politicians.  This is effectively 
Richard Posner’s claim about Bush v. Gore, that the Justices properly took into consideration the need to 
avoid a constitutional crisis. Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore as Pragmatic Adjudication, in A BADLY 
FLAWED ELECTION (DEBATING) BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 187-
213 (ed, Ronald Dworkin, New Press, 2002) (Hereinafter Pragmatic Adjudication).  Hence, the judicial 
role is well-suited (and perhaps only suited) to solving both of these types of political problems.
124
 Issacharoff and Pildes have been criticized for ignoring the true import of Duverger’s law before.  See
Daniel Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics, pg 260-633 in THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (Daniel K. Ryden ed. 2000).  Lowenstein makes several claims 
about the way Duverger’s law clashes with Politics as Markets.  The first is that, even if the Supreme Court 
ruled in the way Issacharoff and Pildes advocate, overruling decisions like Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 
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above, Duverger argued that FPTP systems inevitably result in a two-party system.125
Issacharoff and Pildes describe this as the “natural duopoly” problem of the American 
electoral system.  As a result, they argue, designing an election law system to create third 
parties is futile; without getting rid of single member districts and FPTP, it would be 
impossible.  However, because elected officials come from political parties, there is a 
chance for “inside dealing.” Borrowing from corporate law, they argue that rules that 
428 (1992) and argued that the Constitution required voters to able to write-in candidates on both primary 
and general election ballots, there would still be a two-party duopoly because of Duverger’s Law.  “It is not 
clear what difference it would make if the Court were to subscribe to their theory of partisan lockups as the 
key to election law adjudication.” Id. at 263 This criticism misses the mark – Politics as Markets makes 
explicit that the changes it proposes will not bring down the two-party system but will instead create 
competitive pressures on it.   Lowenstein makes no attempt to refute this claim.  The problem with the 
proposals of Politics as Markets is not that they would have no effect, as Lowenstein claims, but rather that 
their effect would be to worsen that value they seek to enhance – the degree of representation – and would 
endanger the Schumpeterian stability of the American electoral systems, rooted in the decisiveness of two-
party elections. 
Lowenstein’s second criticism is that “academic theories such as those of…Issacharoff and Pildes 
inevitably are woefully insufficient as guides to adjudication…The starting points for their theories are 
much to narrow…These authors’ failure to make any serious inquiry into the nature of political competition 
in the United Staes is more indicative than idiosyncratic.” Id. at 263.  This paper is an attempt to solve this 
problem – both by providing guides to solving certain future cases and by examining more closely the 
effect structural factors like FPTP elections have on electoral markets.  
125
 A few countries with FPTP elections – notably Canada, India and Great Britain –have had periods where 
here have been more than two viable parties.  However, these are the exceptions that prove the rule. See
Politics as Markets, supra note _, at 675 (“Modern studies confirm Duverger's analysis”).
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favor the two-party system should be given a “hard look.”126  Rules that incidentally help 
the two parties should be considered acceptable, but, for instance, bans on “fusion” 
candidates should be barred because they entrench the two parties.
As an effort to fashion a coherent jurisprudence, this view faces a major problem; 
it does not explain why the Constitution should protect FPTP/single member district 
elections at all.  A consistent application of the values inherent in the rules favored by 
Issacharoff and Pildes use would lead, rather mechanically, towards proportional 
representation (PR). While a few authors have disputed this, it is relatively clear that our 
FPTP system imposes a severe burden on the extent to which elected officials are 
representative of voters’ preferences when compared with a PR scheme.127 Without some 
other justification, like balancing Schumpeterian values with those of representation, it is 
impossible to consistently apply the rules favored by Issacharoff and Pildes and maintain 
FPTP elections.
Issacharoff and Pildes justify this claim by arguing that the Framers of the 
Constitution did not favor FPTP/single-member district elections because they produced 
126 See Politics as Markets, supra note 12, at 680-681 (“Regardless of how permissive ballot access laws 
are, third parties are never going to be able to do more than put competitive pressure on dominant parties. 
The FPTP system virtually ensures continuing two-party dominance.  Any "state" interest in additional 
regulations designed to buttress the two-party system would therefore seem largely superfluous. But within 
that structure, more scope for competitive pressure will produce politics that is more responsive to the 
interests of voters. At times, this pressure might take the form of existing forces defecting from the party at 
election time; at other times, it might take the form of new parties temporarily arising to express viewpoints 
shut out of the two-party dialogue.”)
127 See Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many, 224-40, 258-61.
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two-party politics.  “Indeed, when the Constitution was formed and early elections held, 
the very idea of political parties was anathema to the reigning conception of 
democracy…The idea that the FPTP system would have been justified because of its 
tendency to produce party politics, let alone two-party politics, could hardly have formed 
any part of the justification for these structures.”128  As such, they argue that, though 
FPTP/single member district elections should be protected as a historical anomaly, like 
the Electoral College.  “Courts should not infer out of these structures broad normative 
principles that ought to govern the entire political process.”129
Even if one accepts this line of argument, the effect of constitutional regulations 
on the political process changes when constraints, like FPTP/single member district 
elections, are added.  A doctrine that would produce efficient (i.e. representative) results 
absent structural constraints does not necessarily do so when faced with implications of 
such constraints.   Even if the sole goal is to produce efficient/representative results, it 
makes sense to build FPTP/single-member districts into the model because, otherwise, 
we may diagnose a solution that cannot treat the problem that actually exists.
Politics as Markets and the articles that followed it acknowledge that there is a 
market imperfection, a “natural duopoly,” but then merely argue that anti-competitive 
behavior by the parties as a result of their market dominance should be constrained.  They 
treat this “natural duopoly” like an ordinary one. This is a mistake, but in order to 
understand why it is a mistake, it is important to understand the extensive economic 
literature on natural monopolies.
128 Politics as Markets, supra note _, at 677.
129 Id. at 679.
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Natural monopoly stands as one of the classic problems in the economics of 
industrial organization.130  Natural monopolies exist when the cost of production of a 
good is minimized when a single firm produces the entire market output because of 
economies of scale (or, formally, declining long run average cost curves).131  The larger a 
firm is in this type of industry is, the cheaper it will produce goods.  This creates barriers 
to entry – firms generally start off small and, in industries like these, small firms cannot 
compete because their costs are to high.  As a result, these markets tend towards having 
one large firm.  Moreover, by definition, this is the most efficient result.  However, this 
raises the risk of monopoly pricing: once there is only one firm, that firm will be able to 
raise prices because of its monopoly position.132  An ideal form of natural monopoly 
regulation would permit society to gain from economies of scale – by allowing one firm 
to control all production – without allowing the monopoly to take advantage of its market 
power. 
  In some industries, natural monopoly is a temporary condition.133   Often, there 
will be economies of scale, but only to a point – average cost will stop declining and level 
130 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An American Historical 
Perspective, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1263, 1270 (discussing the history of economic analysis of the monopoly 
problems caused by economies of scale).   For a general discussion of the natural monopoly problem see, 
e.g., Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 139-45 (1972); Richard Posner, Natural 
Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 548 (1969); Richard Schmalensee, THE CONTROL OF 
NATURAL MONOPOLIES 3-5 (1979) William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (1982).
131
 See Economic Regulation, supra note 20, at 337.
132 See id.
133 See Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, supra note _, at 636 (“But natural monopoly 
conditions are quite likely to be transient”).
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off.  If demand increases enough, then, another firm can enter the market because it, too, 
will be able to get the efficiencies of scale.134  Also, in some industries there are natural 
monopolies, but the effect of high prices spurs technological change, which creates 
competition.135  Actual natural monopolies are rare, and situations in which the picture is 
as simple as this are almost non-existent, because natural monopolies usually involve the 
production of more than one type of good.136  For instance, selling electricity 
transmission includes the provision of two services, putting wires into houses – which is, 
because of the huge necessary capital outlay, almost a pure natural monopoly – and 
generating electricity, which is almost certainly not.137
This problem has been explored for decades and a number of alternatives have 
been proposed.138   The most generally accepted model of natural monopoly regulation 
includes a restriction on anti-trust actions against the firm in return for some type of 
complex pricing restriction.139  Various models that create efficient or near-efficient 
outcomes have been proposed, but remain subject to the realization that the cost of 
imposing them, in the direct and indirect costs of creating a regulatory apparatus, creates 
134 See Economic Regulation, supra note 20. at 338-39.
135 See, e.g., Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, supra note 43, at 556.
136
 W.J. Baumol, On The Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry, American 
Economic Review, December 1977.
137 See, e.g., Andrew J. Roman, Electricity Deregulation in Canada: An Idea Which has Yet to be Tried?,
40 Alberta L. Rev. 97, 106 (2002)
138 See generally Stephen Breyer, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15 (1982).
139
 For a discussion of the general model, see Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph Tomain, REGULATORY LAW 
AND POLICY 196-97 (1993)
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inefficiencies.140  On top of this, efforts are made to split off markets that are actually 
competitive from those that are natural monopolies (e.g. allowing competition in long 
distance telephony while regulating the firms that own the lines that actually enter 
people’s homes).141  This combination allows competition where it is efficient to have 
more than one firm, but permits society to gain from the diminishing average cost of 
production without suffering from monopoly pricing where it is not.
The question, then, should be, to what extent is this metaphor useful for 
understanding elections.  To answer this question affirmatively, we need to identify what 
the relevant equivalent to declining average cost, or, in other words, why is it efficient 
(rather than merely likely) to have only two parties in our electoral system.  The answer 
is rather simple; in a single district/FPTP system, having only two parties increases the 
likelihood that there will be a candidate selected by a majority rather than a plurality of 
the voters.  This increases the likelihood that policies represent the interests of the 
electorate. For instance, a 60% right-center majority cannot lose an election in a two-
party system as the result of that vote being divided between two parties while the 
opposition is united.  As such, the likelihood of majority election can serve as a way to 
judge electoral natural duopoly in the way declining average cost does in an economic 
natural monopoly, since both reveal the extent of gains from not having multiple entrants.
Moreover, as discussed above, majority elections in a two-party system have 
other benefits.  They confer legitimacy on the winner (who has received the support of 
more than half the population) and allow (and force) all voters to make an analytically 
140 Id. at 356.
141 See Roman, supra note 49, at 108. 
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simpler choice between two rather than many candidates.142  These are exactly the values 
Schumpeter detailed as necessary for democracy in a mass society. 
Therefore, rules that serve to promote a two-party system are good and not bad.  
Issacharoff and Pildes understand this to a point, but back off when confronted with the 
implications of the argument.  They acknowledge the likelihood of two-party government 
and argue that rules, like districted FPTP elections, that “incidentally” benefit a two-party 
system are acceptable.  They reject, though, those rules that explicitly favor a two-party 
system.143  There are good reasons to avoid rules that help the current two parties: None 
of the benefits of a two-party system are dependent on the parties being known as 
“Democrats” and “Republicans” and, if the organizations of either of those parties ceases 
to be responsive to voter concerns, there is no particular reason why one of them should 
not be replaced.   However, rules that entrench the existence of a two-party system are, 
according to this model, beneficial.   Moreover, there is nothing about the benefits 
created here that are incompatible with the two-party system consisting of the two parties 
we have now.  So rules that help entrench the two-party system are fine so long as they 
are not directed at ensuring that one of the existing parties is able to survive without 
142
 The substantive values created by the existence of only two parties has been chronicled at length by a 
group of scholars known as the “responsible party government” school.  See, e.g., Toward a More 
Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties American Political Science 
Association (Rinehart, 1950) . For a critical discussion of their work, see Hasen, supra note 16, at 345-351.
143 See Politics as Markets, supra note 12, at 674 (“[T]he fact that FPTP elections strongly tend toward 
two-party politics does not mean that courts should license those parties to manipulate electoral systems to 
further insulate the dominant parties from those few possible sources of competitive pressure that do 
potentially remain.”)
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being responsive to voter needs and desires.144  This natural duopoly understanding of 
constitutional oversight of electoral regulation, as will be seen below, closely tracks 
current Supreme Court doctrine.
That problem resolved, the question becomes how to ideally ensure effective 
“pricing” in an electoral natural duopoly.  Most of the strategies used in natural 
monopoly situations would not make much sense in an electoral situation, and those that 
do have little to do with the regulation of party primaries.  However, the very fact that it 
is a duopoly and not a monopoly will result in competition between the parties.  
Duopolies generally create either a perfectly optimal market or a market that is sub-
optimal but still better than a monopoly, depending on your assumptions about the ways 
firms interact.145  For this to work, though, the parties have to be distinct from and 
144
 In Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973), the Supreme Court made this explicit.  The Court 
held that a redistricting plan that created safe seats for both parties in equal proportion to their support from 
voters was constitutionally permissible.   “[J]udicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State 
purports fairly to allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within 
quite tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so.” In Vieth v. Jubelier, though a plurality found that there was no 
judiciable standard courts could rely on to identify partisan gerrymanders, all nine members of the Supreme 
Court agreed districting decisions that resulted in electoral results grossly different from voting tallies 
violated the Constitution. 124 S. Ct. at 1769.
145
 Each of the three major static duopoly models, “Bertrand,” “Cournot” or “Stackelberg” competition, 
result in different levels of market inefficiency (or in the case of Bertrand, or price, competition, perfect 
efficiency).   None result in the monopolistic level of inefficiency.  See Robert F. Lanzillotti, Coming To 
Terms With Daubert In Sherman Act Complaints: A Suggested Economic Approach, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 83, 95 
n.31 (1998) (citing Augustin Cournot, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY 
OF WEALTH (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Macmillan Co. 1927) (1838); Edward Chamberlin, THE THEORY OF 
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actually compete with one another.  The latter is not really a part of the regulation of 
primary elections – the debates over political gerrymandering and campaign finance are 
more relevant for this discussion– but the former is exactly the rule set out in Jones.  
Retaining distinct parties is necessary not only to ensure that parties issue representative 
policies (because competition has, as a pre-condition, an assumption that each market 
player can freely devise policy), but also to ensure that the system retains for the citizenry 
the ability to replace a government they do not like with something different, a central 
goal of a competitive democracy model. 
Finally, the third piece of natural monopoly regulation is to separate off 
competitive markets.  Deregulation in telephony and electricity has in some situations 
accomplished this by creating competitive markets in long distance phone calls and 
electricity generation, creating a more efficient overall industry.  Similarly, in order to 
reach the goal of policies that are representative of the interests of voters, members of 
that political party should be able to vote in primary elections free from restrictive rules 
about who can appear on the ballot imposed by a party’s organization.  The reason free 
primaries promote representative general election is that members of the party only 
interest is in choosing the most competitive candidate.  Party officials, on the other hand, 
have strong incentives for inside dealing (i.e. for party officials trying to favor other 
active members of the party organization, rather than the most competitive candidate) 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (5th ed. 1946); Heinrich Von Stackelberg, MARKTFORM UND 
GLEICHGEWICHT (Wien & Berlin 1934); Wassily Leontief, Stackelberg on Monopolistic Competition, J. 
Pol. Econ. Aug. 1936, at 554, 554-559; J. Bertrand, Book Review, 67 Jour. Des Savants 499 
(1883)(reviewing THEORIE MATHEMATIQUE DE LA RICHESSE SOCIALE and RECHERCHES SUR LES 
PRINCIPES MATHEMATIQUES DE LA THEORIE DES RICHESSES)).
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because it increases the value of being a party member.   Moreover, people who invest 
time and energy into running parties are generally more radical politically and the may 
use party rules to promote candidates who are further from the mainstream.146  As such, 
opening up the primary ballot to any party member is more likely to produce competitive 
general election candidates than permitting the party organization to pass strict ballot 
access rules, and, hence, to create policies that are responsive to the interests of the 
electorate in toto. 
This vision of election law requires a Supreme Court willing to strike down a 
number of state statutes that do not conform to this idea of competition.  However, since 
current Supreme Court doctrine basically follows this line of reasoning, this model would 
not require changes in doctrine.  It would also not require the Court to be more activist 
than Pildes and Issacharoff would want it to be -- it would just require the Court to 
overrule different laws.  The organizing principle behind the constitutional review of 
electoral regulation would be efficient competition, given the imperfect nature of electoral 
markets, rather than the simpler competitive model Pildes and Issacharoff propose.   
Restrictions on efficient competition could be justified, though, if the rules served to 
protect the two Schumpeterian constraints – clarity and decisiveness.  However, with the 
proper understanding of efficient competition, few laws or executive decisions will need 
to be justified, because the factors that contribute to creating efficient competition also 
146
 See Note _ and accompanying text.
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produce clear choices for voters and decisive results, specifically protecting the two-party 
system and free competition between the parties.147
147
 This is not to say the Schumpeterian constraints never bind.   The example that shows how these work in 
practice is the most famous election law case, Bush v. Gore. The Per Curiam decision found a violation of 
one of the component parts of efficient competition, arguing that applying the “intent of the voter” standard 
would result in unfair competition between the parties and that there was not time to create a fair, statewide 
standard.  532 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).  Moreover, the state had no compelling reason – no reason that 
furthered the ends of clarity of choice or decisiveness of result – to recount the ballots.  Just the opposite, 
recounting the ballots would result in a less decisive result.  See Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note _, at 
187-212.  This meant that the state could not justify damage to representation.  The reasonableness of the 
determination that the state could not fashion a fair standard in time notwithstanding, Bush v. Gore stands, 
under this understanding, as a rather straightforward application of the test this paper argues is central to 
election law. 
It is in the concurring opinion, though, that we see the application of the Schumpeterian 
constraints.   The concurring opinion claimed that Article II gave the Court the power to overrule the state 
court decision to have a recount.  Bush, 532 U.S. at 112.  If, for a moment, we ignore the federalism 
problems of this interpretation and accept that Article II gives the Supreme Court the right to review state 
court interpretations of state election law regarding Presidential elections, the concurrence becomes an 
application of the Schumpeterian constraints.  The Florida Supreme Court had argued that “the need for 
prompt resolution and finality is especially critical in presidential elections where there is an outside 
deadline established by federal law. Notwithstanding, consistent with the legislative mandate and our 
precedent, although the time constraints are limited, we must do everything required by law to ensure that 
legal votes that have not been counted are included in the final election result.”  Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 
1243, 1261 (Fla. 2000).  In the framework of this paper, this is effectively a statement that efficient 
competition would have been harmed (because the results of that competition would not be known) by not 
counting the votes, even if doing so did not promote finality.  The concurrence argued that the state 
legislative rule, which put certification in the hands of local canvassing boards and the Secretary of State, 
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III. Current Law: Two Legs of a Tripod
The case law regulating political parties is notoriously complex, under-theorized 
and internally contradictory in its rhetoric.  One way of looking at this mishmash is 
through the lens of natural monopoly regulation.  It is not necessary to believe that courts 
consciously had this paradigm in mind to believe that existing doctrine accommodates 
state policy that fits within this idea of how elections should operate (and looks askance 
at policy that does not).  The “natural duopoly” theory would require the constitutional 
review of election law to consist of three major components – a lack of regulation of state 
efforts to permit the retention of the market power of political parties, active regulation of 
their “pricing,” and an effort to segment downstream markets from the market suffering 
from the natural monopoly problem.  As will be seen below, the first two parts of this are 
clearly visible in Supreme Court doctrine while the third leg is still up in the air. That leg 
consists of a variety of lower court and indirectly applicable Supreme Court opinions 
about restrictions laid down by states or by political parties on access primary ballots to 
candidates who are certainly members of that political party.  
Moreover, in each of the cases discussed below, the test employed by the 
Supreme Court to test electoral regulations will represent an effort to balance two 
should be enforced and that the state court should not have overruled their decisions.  Id. at 122.  This is an 
implicit claim that the state was justified in limiting the counting of fair votes.   It effectively upended the 
logic of the Florida Supreme Court and held that “the need for prompt resolution and finality in Presidential 
elections” did justify limiting fair representation.  The concurrence is hence saying that the state legislature 
had the right (and did) to limit the representativeness of government in order to produce more decisive 
elections.
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competing visions about the value of electoral competition: representation and 
Schumpeterian decisiveness and clarity.  Though the steps sometimes merge, the rights 
the Supreme Court has recognized are necessary to maximize representativeness in a 
FPTP system, specifically free decision-making inside parties, but not the right to 
interfere in the decision-making of other parties (the three legs of the tripod).  The 
interests the Supreme Court has found to be compelling enough to infringe on these rights 
are those that promote clarity and decisiveness, the two values essential to the 
Schumpeterian model of democracy.   
A. The First Leg: Ignoring Market Power
The key insight of natural monopoly theory is that, under certain circumstances, it 
is more efficient to have only one firm producing a certain good because certain markets 
exhibit a diminishing marginal cost of production.148  The resulting regulation seeks to 
take advantage of these economies of scale while avoiding the problems associated with 
monopoly control.  If the American electoral system is a “natural duopoly,” then 
constitutional review of electoral regulation of parties should permit rules that favor the 
existence of a two-party system, but not those rules that create extensive protection of the 
existing two parties.
Courts following this paradigm would view the entrenchment of a two-party 
system as a reasonable, even laudable, goal of state regulation.  After years of accepting 
in theory but being suspicious in practice of this type of policy,149 the Supreme Court 
148
 See notes __ and accompanying text.
149 See, e.g., Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 32 (1968) (“The fact is, however, that the Ohio system does not merely 
favor a “two-party system”; it favors two particular parties -- the Republicans and the Democrats -- and in 
effect tends to give them a complete monopoly.”).
61
established the principle that states could privilege a two-party system in their regulation 
of primaries in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party.150
Timmons involved a Minnesota state law that said no candidate could appear on 
the general election ballot as the candidate of more than one party.  While technically this 
is a general election regulation, it is actually a regulation of primaries in that it restricts 
the choice-set of parties to those candidates not endorsed by any other.  “Fusion” of this 
type has been a classic strategy for third parties to influence the political system, because 
it allows third parties to gain a toehold in certain elections while running their own 
candidates in others.151  The New Party – a small left-leaning party -- challenged 
Minnesota’s law on the grounds that it restricted their First Amendment right 
associational rights.152
The Court rejected this claim, arguing that, while the First Amendment protects 
decisions by political parties about their own internal structure and activities, states can 
and must regulate primary elections.153  The test to see whether a particular regulation is 
150
 520 U.S. at 367.  See generally James Gray Pope, Fusion, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party and 
the Future of Third Parties in the United States, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 473 (1998); Hasen, supra note __, at 
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151 See Argersinger, “A Place on the Ballot”: Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85 Amer. Hist. Rev. 
287, 288 (1980); Douglas Amy quotes New Party leader Dan Cantor as saying it “is no exaggeration to 
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unconstitutional is straight-forward:  “[W]e weigh the character and magnitude of the 
burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends 
justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden 
necessary.”154  If a burden is severe, the regulation must be narrowly tailored and advance 
a compelling state interest.  States are, unsurprisingly, given more leeway when imposing 
less substantial burdens.155
The Court found that the burden placed on the New Party was not severe.  The 
provisions only slightly reduced the number of people that the party could chose as their 
standard-bearer and barely limited the party’s ability to communicate to the general 
population who was its most favored candidate.156   “Many features of our political 
system--e.g., single-member districts, "first past the post" elections, and the high costs of 
campaigning--make it difficult for third parties to succeed in American politics.”157
Because the restriction imposed no direct limit on the Party’s ability to organize or 
develop, it was not a severe limitation of the Party’s First and Fourteenth Amendment 
associational rights.158
Minnesota provided a number of justifications for this limited restriction.  Among 
these was an interest in political stability.  The Court said that, while “this interest does 
not permit a State to completely insulate the two-party system from…competition and 
influence,” it does permit it “to enact reasonable election regulations that may, in 
154 Id. at 358 (internal citations omitted).  
155 Id. at 359.  This test was first developed in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
156 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 362.
157 Id. at 362.
158 Id. at 365.
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practice, favor the traditional two-party system.”159  As such, a state statute banning 
fusion was not unconstitutional.   
This is consistent with the ideas of optimal natural monopoly regulation.  A 
natural monopoly regulator would not “completely insulate” a monopolist by, say, 
banning the development of new technology that could change the market into a normally 
competitive one.  It would however actively regulate the market and, by doing so, favor 
the natural monopolist over potential competition.  The Court’s reasoning in Timmons, 
then, permits a natural monopoly style regulation of elections.  
Applying this concept to fusion is not analytically simple.  After all, fusion 
initially increases the chances of a majority victor, because votes for third parties can 
accrue to one of the top two candidates.  However, its overall effect might aid third 
parties, which will lead to more plurality elections down the road.160  Doing so might lead 
to a less representative electoral scheme – though it also may not because the availability 
of fusion will help ensure more majority elections when there are third parties.  The 
determination of whether permitting fusion is more likely to produce representative 
results than banning it is a difficult question and it is therefore reasonable that state 
legislatures can and should make decisions about it.  Analytically, it is similar in this 
respect to run-off elections; run-offs promote majority winners but also promote third 
parties.  Run-off elections are not constitutionally mandated, nor are they barred, and it is 
a reasonable result to allow states the same discretion in making policy about fusion. 
159 Id. at 366-367.
160
 This, after all, is the reason third parties want fusion.  Hasen, supra note _, at 331. 
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The Court allowed Minnesota to favor a two-party system at two points in its 
analysis.  First, it defined the right to association in such a way that the ability to choose a 
candidate who was the candidate of a major-party candidate was not protected by the 
First Amendment and the fusion ban’s limit on a third party’s ability to express 
information to its voters only the most minor of infringements on First Amendment 
association rights. 161 A model based on ordinary antitrust principles would have viewed 
this as a major limitation on the right to compete.  Thus, the way the Court defines rights 
is consistent with natural duopoly regulation. 
The second way the Court favored the two-party system was to permit it to serve 
as a justification for a state’s decision to limit associational rights.  The reasons 
Minnesota gave and the Court accepted for permitting the state to ban fusion were 
straight out of Schumpeter: “avoiding voter confusion and overcrowded ballots, 
preventing party-splintering and disruptions of the two-party system, and being able to 
clearly identify the election winner”162
In Timmons, the Court held promoting the Schumpeterian values of clarity of 
choice and decisiveness of result are justifiable state interests.  The Court’s analysis then 
161
 “Minnesota's laws do not restrict the ability of the New Party and its members to endorse, support, or 
vote for anyone they like. The laws do not directly limit the Party's access to the ballot. They are silent on 
parties' internal structure, governance, and policy-making. Instead, these provisions reduce the universe of 
potential candidates who may appear on the ballot as the Party's nominee only by ruling out those few 
individuals who both have already agreed to be another party's candidate and also, if forced to choose, 
themselves prefer that other party. They also limit, slightly, the Party's ability to send a message to the 
voters and to its preferred candidates. We conclude that the burdens Minnesota imposes on the Party's First 
and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights--though not trivial--are not severe.” Id. at 364.
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represents a balancing of the values of representation and the Schumpeterian model of 
democracy.  While it ultimately rested on a determination that the state’s interest in 
stability was more important than the limited way in which it burdened representation, 
the Court’s doctrine narrowed the scope of judicial discretion to a few variables on which 
factual evidence could be marshaled and by which the Court could come to a reasoned, 
principled decision.
The Court’s decision in Timmons has been criticized by most commentators, 
including Issacharoff and Pildes.163  The harshest of these critics has been Rick Hasen. 
Hasen attacks the value of the two-party system, but the central part of his argument is 
that because of Duverger’s Law, the two-party system needs no protection by state 
law.164
This argument is flawed. He correctly notes that, because of Duverger’s Law, a 
third party is unlikely to make a major impact in American political life.  But this ignores 
the reasons why a two-party system is seen as a positive; it mistakes means for ends.  
Arguments in favor of a two-party system rely on the fact that is provides clear choices 
162 Id.
163 See Politics as Market, supra note _, at 683-86.
164
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for voters and decisive results (the two Schumpeterian values) and creates majority 
winners (promote election results as representative as possible under the condition of 
FPTP).  A two-party system with somewhat viable third parties – something that
prohibiting states from creating rules like fusion bans would make more likely – achieves 
none of these ends.  Voters would face more complicated decisions and it would be 
possible for a majority to lose elections because it is divided between two candidates, 
which would be less decisive (because the losing majority would be disaffected with the 
result) and less representative (because the majority would have lost).  Thus, creating 
rules that favor a two-party system is necessary to achieve the benefits of a two-party 
system even if two parties would continue to dominate elections even in their absence. 
The Court was right to recognize that promoting a two-party system is a compelling 
justification for state policy.     
The Second Leg: Competition and Distinctness as a Pricing Mechanism
In order for society to gain from having only one producer in a natural monopoly 
setting without losing from a monopolist exploiting its market power, there need to be 
regulations on the prices that the (natural) monopolist can charge.165  A variety of 
different schemes have been proposed, but, since electoral markets are a natural duopoly, 
one available way to get the “firms” to limit their prices is to make sure they compete 
with each other.  While much of the policy about this is made in realms other than 
political party primaries (e.g., campaign financing, redistricting), one piece of regulation 
in this area is necessary in order to have this price-limiting competition: distinct parties. 
For political parties to be able to use their policy mixes to appeal to voters, they must be 
165
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able to freely define those policies.  This entails the ability to define their membership.  If 
decision-making about standard-bearers is made at the primary level, the party must be 
able to define who is a member, so that interlopers cannot interfere with its decisions.  
This way the parties are able to independently come up with a set of candidates and 
policies that appeal to voters.  
In California Democratic Party v. Jones, the Supreme Court established just this 
principle, that the party organization can define who can be a member of the party.166  In 
order to understand Jones, it is necessary to briefly go over the case law surrounding state 
laws (or judicial interpretations of Constitutional rights) that sought to define party 
membership.  The modern age of party primary regulation started with the White Primary 
Cases, in which the Supreme Court struck down a number of different barriers to the 
participation of African-Americans in Democratic primaries in one-party states.167
Nathaniel Persily summarized these cases thusly:
Alongside poll taxes, grandfather clauses, literacy tests, and other more violent 
and coercive tactics of disenfranchisement, white primaries were used by 
Southern states and the Democratic Party and its subdivisions to prevent African 
Americans from voting in what turned out to be the critical and determinative 
election in those one-party states. Between 1927 and 1953, the Court overruled 
its previous precedents and struck down a state statute that forbade the 
participation of African Americans in the Democratic primary, and a statute that 
delegated to the party executive committee the power to determine qualifications 
166
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to vote in a party primary which it then exercised to ban African Americans 
from the primary. Moreover…the Court struck down the Democratic Party's 
practice (not mandated by state law) of excluding African Americans from 
primaries. The Court held that "the recognition of the place of the primary in the 
electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power to fix 
the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may 
make the party's action the action of the State." Considering the primary in this 
way, the Court interpreted the Fifteenth Amendment as preventing a state from 
"casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization to 
practice racial discrimination in the election." Then, in a highly fractured 
decision in the last of the White Primary Cases, Terry v. Adams, the Court 
extended this reasoning even to the conduct of a party's unofficial subdivision or 
alter ego, whose candidate selection mechanism effectively determined the 
Democratic nominee that appeared on the ballot.168
The crucial question in all of these cases became state action or, rather, determining when  
policy, created by the direct action of the state legislature, by political party rules 
propagated by the party organization or by some subset of the party organization, is 
subject to the restriction of the Equal Protection Clause.   The Supreme Court, in these 
cases and others, developed a three-part test for state action.  “As a general rule, state 
action will not be found unless: (1) the actor is an agent of the government; (2) the actor 
performs a function "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State;" or (3) the 
government "jointly participates" with the private actor.”169  Political parties, at least 
when controlling party primaries, meet all three of these conditions and do so rather 
easily.170  While these cases made clear that parties were state actors when conducting 
primaries, they did not resolve the question of whether political parties retained any First 
Amendment right to exclude people from their primaries. 
168
 Nathaniel Persily, Towards a Functional Defense of Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U.L. Rev 750, 755-56 
(2001).
169 Id.  at 760.
170 Id.
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Until Jones, this question was not clearly answered.  This is not to say the Court 
did not encounter these issues.  The two most relevant of these cases were Democratic 
Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette171 and Tashijan v. Republican Party.172  In La 
Follete, the Court upheld a national party rule that excluded delegates to the Presidential 
nominating convention selected by a state mandated “open primary” process (a primary 
in which any voter, regardless of party, could participate).173  In Tashijan, the Court stuck 
down a state law that prevented the Republican Party of Connecticut from including 
independents in its primary.174  In these cases, the Court embraced the concept that 
parties bear meaningful associational rights, even when conducting primaries.  At the 
same time, though, the Court was developing a contrary strain of jurisprudence.  In 
Rosario v. Rockefeller, the Court upheld a state law declaring that person must enroll in a 
political party at least 30 days before the November general election in order to be 
eligible to vote in the party's primary election held during the following year.175  The 
Court found that a state interest in maintaining orderly elections and in the stability of 
171
 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
172
 479 U.S. 208 (1986).  See also Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 
214, 216 (1989) (holding that a political party organization could not be prohibited by state law from 
endorsing a candidate in a primary election); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 483 (1975) (holding that 
Illinois state courts could not force the Democratic Party to seat delegates chosen by procedures contrary to 
internal party rules). 
173
 450 U.S. at 112.
174
 479 U.S. at 212.
175
 410 U.S. 752, 754 (1972).  See also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726 (1974) (holding that a state law 
that prevented any person from being the candidate of a party (or running as an independent) if they had 
been a member of another party within the past 12 months was unconstitutional). 
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party structures justified the limitations on the rights of voters.  Though internal party 
rules were not in question in the case, Rosario made the constitutionality of a party rule 
permitting quick party switching seem dubious.  The extent to which a political party’s 
power could determine its own rules about party membership when faced with 
constitutional challenges or contrary state law was not certain.
The Jones case was a response to Proposition 198, a statewide initiative passed in 
1996.  The voters of California changed their system for selecting candidates from a 
“closed primary,” in which only registered party members could participate, to a “blanket 
primary” system, which allows any voter to vote for any candidate in any primary in 
same electoral cycle.176  Blanket primaries are supposed to promote moderate candidates 
because they dilute the power of core partisans.  A majority of the members of all parties 
voted for the law, which passed with overwhelming support.177  The California 
Democratic, Republican, Libertarian and Peace and Freedom parties, however, all had 
internal rules barring non-members from participating in their primaries.178  They 
challenged the state law as violating the First Amendment “right not to associate.”
Overruling a Ninth Circuit decision in favor of the state,179 the Supreme Court 
invalidated the law.180  The Court first distinguished the blanket primary from the rules in 
question in the White Primary Cases.  Those cases dealt with political parties that, in their 
capacity as state actors, developed rules that violated an “independent constitutional 
176See Jones, 530 U.S. at 570.
177 Id. at 601 (Stevens dissenting).
178 Id. at 571.
179 See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 160 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 1999).
180 Jones, 530 U.S. at 586.
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proscription.”181 This case was distinguishable because it dealt with the question of 
whether an otherwise constitutional party rule mandating a closed primary could be 
removed by state laws. 
 The Court did not deny that party rules were state action, but stated that “when 
States regulate parties' internal processes. they must act within limits imposed by the 
Constitution.” 182 One of those restrictions was the right to freedom of association 
possessed by political parties, as represented by the party organization. “[T]he 
constitutional rights of those composing the party cannot be disregarded.”183  While the 
Court noted that “an election, unlike a convention or caucus, is a public affair,” it argued 
that “when the election determines a party's nominee it is a party affair as well, and … 
the constitutional rights of those composing the party cannot be disregarded.”184
This associational right included the right to exclude people from the party.  
Ruling otherwise without overruling Tashijan, the Court argued, would lead to 
“nonsensical” results. Tashijan stated that political parties had the constitutional right to 
permit independents to vote in their primaries. Failing to acknowledge a correlative right 
to exclude would mean that “[t]he First Amendment would thus guarantee a party's right 
to lose its identity, but not to preserve it.”185
The Court, though, overstated the holding of Tashijan, which merely permitted 
the Republican Party to include independents in its primary, not members of another 
181 Id. at 573 n.5.
182 Id. at 508-09.
183 Id. at 509.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 511 (citing Tashijan, 479 U.S. at 208).
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party.  This avoided the potential for conflict between the holdings in Tashijan and 
Rosario. The Court in Tashijan noted but did not resolve this question.  Footnote 13 of 
the opinion stated, “Our holding today does not establish that state regulation of primary 
voting qualifications may never withstand challenge by a political party or its 
membership. A party seeking…to open its primary to all voters, including members of 
other parties, would… threaten other parties with the disorganization effects which the 
statute in [Rosario was] designed to prevent.”186 Jones glides over this problem, leaving 
it as a potential exception to the general holding affirming party autonomy in determining 
membership lists.
The Court’s strong defense of the right of parties to exclude made Proposition 198 
unconstitutional.  The Court noted that “[t]he record also supports the obvious 
proposition that these substantial numbers of voters who help select the nominees of 
parties they have chosen not to join often have policy views that diverge from those of 
the party faithful.”187 Because of this and because the selection of candidates is crucial to 
party identity, the burden placed on parties by the blanket primary was grave enough to 
justify strict scrutiny.188 The interest of the state in promoting moderate candidates was 
not sufficient because the state simply could not force private parties – or political parties 
186 Tashijan, 479 U.S. at 213 n.13.
187 Jones, 530 U.S. at 578.
188 Id. at 581.
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– to change their political message.189 Proposition 198 was found unconstitutional 
because it was intended to do just that.
This vision of parties with powerful rights to define their own membership fits the 
natural duopoly model of electoral regulation.  This ability is necessary for parties to be 
able to freely compose a set of policies that can be used to compete for voters, which 
serves as a check on the “pricing” power the two-parties have as a result of Durverger’s 
Law.  The Court defined the right of association, then, in line with the concept of natural 
duopoly regulation.
It should be considered why the state’s interests did not justify impinging on those 
associational rights.  In Timmons, the Court was clear that policies that harmed the right 
to association could be justified if they improved the clarity of decisions for voters, the 
two-party system or the decisiveness of elections.190  In Jones, the Court rejected that 
other justifications, like the fact that blanket primaries would produce more moderate 
candidates, could ever justify burdening the right to association.  Moreover, California 
could not have relied on the Schumpeterian justifications in Jones; the blanket primary 
law reduced rather than enhanced the clarity of choices that general election voters face.  
Less distinct parties mean that voters are less able to use party identification as a cue 
meaning someone different than the incumbent.  Blanket primaries were designed to 
create less distinct parties – it allows members of one party to vote in the primary of 
another.  Though this is impossible to prove (because it requires proving a negative), 
189
 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)  
(holding that the City of Boston could not force a parade organizer opposed to homosexual lifestyles to 
permit gays and lesbians to participate in their parade though its public accommodations law). 
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 See notes __ and accompanying text.
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these two cases make it seem that the only justifications the Court will accept as reasons 
for limiting associational rights are those that promote Schumpeterian values. 
A number of lower court cases have fleshed out the broad discretion that political 
parties have to define their own membership.  The right for parties to ideologically self-
define has not only served as a reason for finding that a state law impermissibly abridges 
a party’s First Amendment rights, but has also served as a compelling state interest to 
justify a law that preserves that autonomy against a claim by a candidate that he had a 
right to appear on a primary ballot.  David Duke’s repeated efforts to run for President as 
a Republican and the efforts of the Georgia Republican Party to keep him off the ballot 
lead to extensive litigation that culminated in Duke v. Massey.191  In that case, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that the state law that gave a committee selected by the Republican 
Party the right to determine who was a candidate for President was state action, but that it 
was constitutional because of a compelling state interest in political parties being able to 
define their own identity and because it was narrowly tailored to advance that interest.192
Moreover, internal party rules excluding Duke as a member of the party were 
constitutional even though the party was a state actor when running its primary.  The 
court made the clearest declaration of this right on record: “The Republican Party has a 
First Amendment right to freedom of association and an attendant right to identify those 
who constitute the party based on political beliefs.”193
191
 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996)
192 Id. at 1235.
193 Id. at 1234.  .
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It should be noted that this is substantively different than state party restrictions 
dealing with whom, among members of a party, can appear on a primary ballot.  The 
Georgia Republican Party argued that Duke’s racist ideology disqualified him from being 
a member, not a candidate, of the party. This rule creates a problem, however.  Given that 
it is relatively easy to become a member of a party and parties do not review the 
membership rolls for ideological, an ideological test that is solely in the hands of the state 
party leadership could become a way for the party organization to simply eliminate from 
the party any candidate that the organization did not like.  Nathaniel Persily offers a 
clever solution to this problem: courts should only accept party organization limitations 
on membership that are based on “criteria for candidacy well before the primary 
campaign begins”194 Doing so would avoid the possibility that party leaders could use 
their right to ideologically define themselves to create impervious barriers to challenging 
their favored candidates.195
Jones also helps explain Timmons.  One way for parties to define themselves, and 
to separate themselves from other parties, would be to enact an internal rule saying that 
no one who is the candidate of another party can receive their endorsement.  The holding 
in Jones would force courts to overrule any state law that tried to overrule this internal 
rule.  Fusion, then, can be banned either by the state (Timmons) or by a political party 
194
 Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot Access 
Laws, 89 Geo. L.J. 2181, 2212 (2001)
195
 Persily’s elegant solution does not solve all of the potential problems with giving a party the ability to 
ideologically self-define.  Theoretically, a party could define its ideology such that it includes a prohibition 
on challenging the choices of the party leadership. This is, of course, more of a theoretical problem than a 
real one; authoritarian parties are unlikely to be popular in American election. 
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(Jones).  Hence, the Supreme Court has not just ruled that a rule against fusion is 
tolerable state policy, but rather that Constitutional oversight of political parties permits 
either the major parties acting in their own interest or the state, acting in the interest of a 
two-party system, to reject fusion.196
While Jones and the related case law deals with the right of political parties to 
define their membership, the question of its potential conflict with Rosario was left open. 
The Supreme Court has simply left open the question it posed in footnote 13 of the 
Tashijan opinion, whether state regulation that limited a “party seeking…to open its 
primary to all voters, including members of other parties, would… threaten other parties 
with the disorganization effects which the statute in [Rosario was] designed to 
prevent.”197  While Tashijan clearly limits the rights of states to paternalistically tell 
parties what is best for them, states do potentially maintain a compelling interest in 
distinct political parties. 
Two circuit courts have dealt with this issue.   In Cool Moose Party v. Rhode 
Island, the First Circuit found for the political party, but only because the state failed to 
make the relevant argument.198 The Tenth Circuit, though, in Beaver v. Clingman
196
 This leads to an interesting question.  In a state like New York, which permits fusion, the major political 
parties would both be better off without it, but individually have an interest in getting extra ballot lines for 
their candidates.  This is a classic Prisoner’s dilemma and legislative fusion bans serve to bind the parties to 
a result pareto superior to the Nash equilibrium.
197 Tashijan, 479 U.S. at 213 n.13.
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addressed the question directly but found that the state had not shown any factual basis 
that allowing members of other parties to vote in a Libertarian Party primary would harm 
political stability. 199
This model calls for the contrary result; a state’s interest in maintaining distinct 
political parties should be considered compelling.  Distinct political parties create free 
competition between the parties, and hence promote both representative election and the 
Schumpeterian ends of clear choices for voters and decisive electoral results.  A state’s 
embrace of this vision of political stability – created by competition from distinct 
political parties – was considered a compelling interest in the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Timmons, allowing the state to limit the otherwise sacrosanct ability of a political party 
to choose its candidate freely. If state laws can limit the ability of a party to choose as 
their nominee the candidate of another party, it stands to reason that they can limit the 
ability of political parties to choose as the membership members of other parties.
The natural duopoly argument would also point to accepting this as a compelling 
state interest.  Jones and Tashijan support two values essential to the model – giving 
parties the ability to freely choose their political message and ensuring that the two major 
parties remain distinct from one another.  A decision by one political party to allow 
members of other parties to vote in its primary would undermine both of these values. In 
order for competition to serve as a constraint on the advantages of the two major parties, 
also other parties or the party system generally. Curiously, however, the State failed to make such an 
argument … on appeal.”).
199
 363 F.3d 1048, 1060 (2004) (“We ultimately conclude that Oklahoma's interest on this record and in the 
circumstances of this case is not a compelling one”).
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they cannot collude and having all voters participate in one party’s primary would 
constitute collusion.200
Subject to this proviso, though, the case law on a party’s ability to define its 
membership fits within the natural duopoly model of electoral regulation.
C. The Missing Third Leg: Downstream Competition
Even where natural monopolies can be perfectly regulated, the problem still 
produces a less than optimal market, if for no other reason than the heavy cost of 
monitoring the natural monopolist’s behavior.201 In a situation like the natural duopoly in 
electoral markets, even the best possible regulations will, most likely, leave significant 
distortions. Hence separating those markets that do have natural monopoly (or natural 
duopoly) characteristics from those that do not is generally considered good policy (e.g.
separating electricity generation from electricity distribution). The reason given above for 
considering the natural duopoly of electoral markets akin to natural monopolies in other 
markets – that increasing the likelihood of majority elections is like the efficiency gains 
from increasing returns to scale in an economic market – does not apply to primary 
elections.  As such, it is sensible to make primary elections as free as possible to 
candidates who are members of the party.  
When faced with state laws regulating primaries, the Supreme Court has generally 
been rather strict.  When state laws have conflicted with the expressive associational 
rights of members of a political party to appear on the primary ballot, the Court has 
200 See Bruce Cain, Party Autonomy and Two-Party Electoral Competition, U. Pa. L. Rev. 793, 810 
(arguing that a blanket primary reduces party competition and decreases party difference).
201 See ECONOMIC REGULATION, supra note 20, at 343.
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looked at them askance except to the extent these laws are necessary to avoid confusion 
on the ballot.202  However, it has never dealt directly with the more difficult question of 
how to analyze party organization rules restricting who, among party members, can 
appear on the ballot.   As a result, courts faced with challenges by candidates to party 
rules around the country have differed.   If the natural monopoly model of electoral 
regulation is to succeed, it is necessary for the Court to resolve this question by ruling 
that party organization rules are subject to the same restrictions as state laws.  Otherwise, 
primary elections will not have the chance to operate as freely functioning markets 
untainted by the natural duopoly problems of general elections.
The reason party rules dealing with primaries should be treated like state laws and 
not given much deference has to do with the role of primaries in elections.  In order to 
explain this, though, it is necessary to discuss what we mean when we say “party.”  V.O. 
Key famously broke political parties down into three parts: “the party-in-the-electorate,” 
(the general membership of the party), “the party-in-government,”  (governmental 
officials elected on the party ticket), and the “party organization,” (those individuals who 
work for the party).203  When we discuss party rules restricting who can be on a primary 
202 Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974) (“The right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be 
cast only for one of two candidates in a primary election at a time when other candidates are clamoring for 
a place on the ballot”)
203 See V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS, 163-65 (5th ed. 1964).  These groups 
are, of course, not so easily separated.  “They are functionally inseparable, of course; party organization is 
principally though not exclusively geared toward running winning candidates in elections in order to 
control the levers of government and put its policies and philosophies into operation.”  Nancy L. 
Rosenblum, Political Parties as Membership Groups, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 813, 818 (2000).  Moreover, the 
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ballot, we are talking about the ways in which the party organization creates rules to limit 
the choices of the party-in-the-electorate.  Similarly, when we discuss state laws limiting 
access to primary ballots, we mean that the party-in-government (presuming the party has 
power in government at the time) is restricting the choices of the party-in-the-electorate.
The first question in any such case would be whether a party rule or state law 
restricts a right that would serve to make elected officials (and hence policy) more 
representative of the preferences of the electorate given the restraints of FPTP elections.  
The key is to look at which understanding of associational rights would result in a general 
election that produced more representative outcomes. There is no compelling policy 
reason that we should interpret the Constitution to protect the right of the “party,” 
however defined, to have officials representative of their preferences except if it serves to 
produce actual elected officials that are representative of the whole population.
These questions turn on motive.  For state laws, it is easy to see that the party-in-
government has little interest in creating primary rules that will produce the  most 
competitive general election candidates.  If the party-in-government controls the 
government, the incumbent officials will have a strong interest in protecting themselves 
from primary challenges.  If the party-in-government does not control the government, 
allowing restrictive state rules to govern a primary would be tantamount to letting a 
party’s major competitor set its rules, surely something that is not likely to produce 
strong general election candidates.  Both the party-in-electorate and the party 
organization have stronger interests in producing competitive party candidates.  Free 
party organization is often composed of elected officials.  That said, as analytic categories, they have 
proved remarkably useful and they will be treated as functionally separate for the purposes of this paper.
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primaries, rather than those impeded by restrictive state laws, are hence more likely to 
produce competitive general election candidates.  Having competitive general election 
candidates from both parties is a condition necessary for competition between the parties 
to result in representative elected officials.  Hence, the Supreme Court’s suspicion of 
state laws that interfere with the ability of candidates to get on primary ballots makes 
sense inside the general framework laid out in this paper.
Making determinations about rules created by the party organization is more 
difficult.  They, unlike elected officials, have an interest in having the strongest possible 
candidate come out of the primary for the simple reason that winning election enhances 
their power and influence.  However, most people willing to devote time and energy to 
party organizations are not much like the party as a whole – they are generally speaking 
more ideologically-driven and radical than their counterparts among the party 
electorate.204  They also generally have relationships with elected officials (or want to be 
elected officials themselves) and have incentives to promote their friends rather than the 
best candidates.  As a result of these ideological and personal commitments, rules 
promoted by the party organization will, on average, produce less competitive candidates 
than those chosen by party electorate.  If we assume that party members share some 
ideological similarity, created through the party’s ability to ideologically self-define, it 
seems safe to argue that primary voters will vote for the candidate they think is most 
likely to win, especially given the generally more committed and interested electorate 
204 See Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? Courts and the Political Process, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95. 104-
05 (2002).
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that shows up for primary elections.  As such, primaries free from party rules are more 
likely to promote competitive general election candidates
Because of the competing motives of party officials, this difference may not be 
large, making the state interest in protecting the associational rights of party members to 
participate in primaries freed from restrictive party rules a relatively weak one.  Even so, 
a state would have to have an interest in overriding even weak associational interests.205
None exists in this context.  According to the model created in this paper, one that is 
consistent with both the reasoning and holding of the entirety of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in this field, the only interests that can be used to justify limiting 
associational rights are those that create general elections with clear choices for voters 
and clear, decisive results.  Party rules that restrict ballot access in primaries cannot be 
said to promote either of these ends – no matter what form the primary takes, the party 
will still only elect one candidate, leaving the general election with only two major party 
representatives, leaving the general electorate with a clear choice between two different 
candidates.  That the candidates will be different from one another is ensured by the rules 
allowing the party (notably the party organization) to ideologically self-define.  Further, 
as long as there are only two candidates from the two major parties, there is no reason to 
think that the identity of the candidate will affect the decisiveness of the election.
Thus understood, there should be a right to participate in free primary elections 
and simply no reason to allow a party organization to create significant hurdles to the 
primary ballot beyond those necessary for an orderly election.  
205
 If party rules are not state action, then the Constitution cannot influence them.  This paper, though, is 
predicated on a contrary assumption – that all primaries do constitute state action, but that 
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The current law tracks this understanding to a point.  The Supreme Court has 
developed relatively clear rules about how to deal with state laws that limit primary ballot 
access – they closely track, but are not identical to, the way courts treat laws about 
general elections.  For instance, Gray v. Sanders involved a state law (and a party rule) 
that gave rural areas more votes in primaries.206  The Court rejected this as violating the 
one-person-one-vote rule and stated the Equal Protection clause applied because this 
constituted state action.207  No mention was made of the independent interests of the 
party or the state interest in providing political parties with autonomy to make their own 
decisions.
Two later cases continued this tactic of determining that state laws controlling 
party primaries were state laws like any other and then judging them by the standards 
developed for general elections.  In Bullock v. Carter and Lubin v. Panish, the Court held 
that high filing fees for primary candidates violated the Equal Protection Clause. 208
Because the laws affected candidates, and not voters directly, they were not subject to 
strict scrutiny, but because restrictions on candidates affect voters indirectly, the standard 
applied was that “the laws must be closely scrutinized and found reasonably necessary to 
206
 372 U.S. 368 (1963)
207 Id. at 374.
208 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 139 (“The filing-fee requirement is limited to party primary elections, 
but the mechanism of such elections is the creature of state legislative choice and hence is "state action" 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Lubin, 415 U.S. at 709.  See Bullock at 139 n. 16 
(“Appellants contend that not every aspect of a party primary election must be considered "state action" 
cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. But we are here concerned with the constitutionality of a 
state law rather than action by a political party”).
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the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in order to pass constitutional 
muster.”209  In neither case did the state meet this burden.  While the proffered reason of 
“keeping its ballots within manageable, understandable limits is of the highest order,” it 
was not enough to justify the filing fees.210 Courts have, following Bullock and Lubin, 
applied this general election test to state laws regulating primary elections.  
Applying the general election test to state primary laws is not the same thing as 
treating them in the same fashion.  General elections feature candidates selected by 
parties, thus limiting who is on the ballot.  States and courts regulate party behavior, 
which in turn effects who is on the general election ballot.  Thus, even if the same 
standard is used to judge laws determining what it takes for a party member to get on the 
primary ballot as are used to judge the laws determining how independents can get on the 
general election ballot, the regulation of primary and general elections remains very 
different.
Determining what is a severe restriction on candidates or voters and, if a 
restriction is severe, what justifications can be compelling are complicated questions.  
While there are a variety of general election rules that raise these issues, the most 
common in primary elections are rules that require candidates to get a certain number and 
type of signatures to get on to the primary ballot.211   These cases turn out to require 
209 Bullock, 350 U.S. at 145-146 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
210 Id. at 143-44.
211 See, e.g., Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851 (7th Cir 2000); Lerman v. Bd. Of Elections, 232 F.3d 135 (2d 
Cir. 2000); Green v. Mortham, 155 F.3d 1332 (M.D.Fla 1998).  Some states also use the “news media” test, 
limiting access to the ballot to those with some significant measure of public support or notoriety.  This has 
received a mixed reaction in the courts. See, e.g., Duke v. Connell, 790 F. Supp. 50, 54-55 (D.R.I. 1992) 
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extensive factual inquiry based on how restrictive the requirement actually is. The most 
famous of these cases was Rockefeller v. Powers, which involved a challenge to the 
complex New York presidential primary laws by Steve Forbes in 1996.212  After an 
extensive factual analysis to determine the extent of the restriction, the court held the 
state law unconstitutional.213  In doing so, it made clear that only justifications that could 
be used at the general election level – like avoiding ballot confusion -- would work for 
primaries.214    One scholar noted that “[the] court rejected almost out of hand any party
interest in filtering out its disfavored candidates, let alone a state interest in giving the 
party the right to define its own membership.”215
The case law surrounding 1996 New York Republican Presidential Primary 
showed that state laws that limited access to primary ballots are judged by the same 
standard used in general elections.  The 2000 New York primary opened the door to 
discussing how to treat party rules that are merely enforced by the state.  After the state 
law that permitted the convoluted primary system was struck down in 1996, the state 
passed a law allowing major political parties to choose one of two possible ways for 
candidates to get their delegates on the presidential primary ballot.216  Clearly designed to 
(holding state statute unconstitutionally vague); LaRouche v. Kezer, 990 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding 
use of news media test because of the availability of alternatives); Kay v. Austin, 621 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 
1980) (upholding news media test).
212
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214 Id. at 156-65, 66.
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216
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allow each party to continue its favored system, the law permitted the Republican Party, 
as an internal decision, to choose a system that continued the high signature requirements 
eliminated from state law in the 1996 election. Supporters of John McCain filed a claim, 
“related” to the 1996 litigation, arguing that the rules were still unconstitutional.217  In 
Molinari v. Powers, a federal district court, after determining that each of the other 
proffered reasons for the strict rules on ballot access were clearly insufficient, noted that 
the “only present comprehensible purpose of the [policy] is to disadvantage a candidate 
for President who does not enjoy the support of the Republican State Committee.”218
Because the Supreme Court stated that “that the particular interests of the major parties 
cannot automatically be characterized as legitimate state interests,” the court found that 
interests of the Republican Party organization did not justify the restriction.219  The policy 
limited the rights of voters and candidates and was not justified by a legitimate state 
interest, making it unconstitutional.
This ruling, formally discussing a state law that permitted parties to make one of 
two choices, leads to an obvious question – what happens when a party rule that is not 
codified at all in state law (except to the extent the state enforces party rules) significantly 
limits access to a primary ballot.  Language in the Molinari decision seems to point to not 
making a distinction between party rules and state laws.  “While [this law/choice] may 
further the interest of the Republican State Committee, as distinguished from the 3.1 
million New York voters affiliated with the Republican Party, it undermines the very 
217 Molinari, 82 F. Supp 2d at 58-59.
218 Id. at 75.
219 Id. at 66 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 830 n.30).
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purpose of a primary, which is to protect the general party membership against this sort 
of minority control by the party leadership.”220  This inclination is by no means universal, 
however.  Looking at how two different courts treated virtually identical party 
organization primary ballot access restrictions makes this clear.
In two cases in the early 1980s, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
dealt with the constitutional status of a Democratic Party rule that required candidates for 
office to get 15% support from the state party convention in order to get on the primary 
ballot.  The state tried to pass a law that allowed candidates to get on the ballot without 
getting 15% support and the Governor asked the SJC for an advisory opinion on its 
constitutionality.  In Opinion of the Justices, the SJC ruled that the state could not 
overrule the party rule because doing so would violate the Democratic Party’s First 
Amendment right to freedom of association.221   The court argued that the state had an 
interest in an orderly ballot, which allowed it to restrict the number of candidates on the 
ballot, but did not have an interest in eliminating party rules which made the ballot more 
orderly still (i.e. restricted access for candidates).  Then, in Langone v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, the SJC ruled that state enforcement of the rule was constitutional 
against a First Amendment challenge brought by individual candidates and voters.222
First, the court held that the party rule did not heavily burden the fundamental interests of 
candidates and voters because candidates were still free to try and get the 15% support 
and because they could run as independents.223  As such, the rule was only subject to 
220 Molinari, 82 F. Supp 2d at 64.
221
 385 Mass. at 1207. 
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rational basis review, and the court held that enforcing the rule was rationally related to 
the legitimate interest the state had in maintaining the integrity of political parties.224
The interests of the state party organization were hence found to be state interests.
Recently, a federal district court in Connecticut faced nearly the same issue but 
came to the opposite conclusion.  In state-wide elections and elections in multi-town 
districts, state law required that, for a candidate to force a primary, she had to have 15% 
support from all the relevant town (and state) party committees.225  The Republican and 
Democratic parties both had internal rules which seconded the state law, meaning that, 
even if a court found the state law unconstitutional, it would still have to rule on the 
question of whether the state could constitutionally enforce the party rules.226  In 
224 Id. at 198.
225 See Campbell v. Bysiewicz, 213 F. Supp. 2d 152, 153 (D.Conn 2002) (Campbell I). 
226 Campbell v. Bysiewicz, 242 F. Supp 2d 164, 167 (D.Conn 2003).  (Campbell II).  There were different 
rules for districts that were entirely contained in one town.  This implicates the Equal Protection clause, but 
that argument (about an earlier version of the same statute) was rejected in Tansley v. Grasso, 315 F. Supp 
513 (D.Conn. 1970).  The Campbell case had a complicated procedural history.  After the claim was 
brought, the district court enjoined the Secretary of State from enforcing the law.   See Campbell I, 213 F. 
Supp at 159.   This left the law for the upcoming primary unclear – the decision was issued only a few 
months before the primary.  Interestingly, the political parties were not party to the suit.  After the ruling, 
the legislature did not change the law and the district court  issued another injuction forcing the Secretary 
of State to permit any Connecticut resident who met minimal standards.   This injunction was overruled by 
the Second Circuit on procedural grounds (because the second injuction had been issued before the appeal 
of the first had been heard on appeal) and because the political parties were, oddly, not party to the first 
suit.   See Stars Align for Direct Primary, Hartford Courant, Feb, 9, 2003 at C2; David Herszenhorn, Court 
Overturns a Ruling on Open Primaries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002 at B5.  After the 2002  primary 
election, the district court heard the case in full.  On summary judgment, it held the state law 
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Campbell v. Bysiewicz, the court held that both the law and the enforcement of the party 
rules were unconstitutional.227  The court found that the party rules imposed a heavy 
burden on the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of candidates and their supporters.  
The state argued that it had a compelling interest in maintaining the associational 
freedom of the parties, but the court rejected this out of hand.  “While the state may not 
impair the right to associate, either of the party or individual voters, that prohibition … 
does not insulate a party monopoly, particularly against insurgents within the party 
seeking to carry its banner.”228  The court then spoke directly to the question of whether 
parties had an independent right to make rules more restrictive of primary ballot access 
than the state. “Even though party interests may differ from state interests, where parties 
are deemed state actors they are not permitted to adopt rules found to be unconstitutional 
when adopted by the state.”229  In doing so, the court issued a per se rule that party rules 
regulating primary ballot access were subject to the exact same Constitutional scrutiny as 
state law.
The approach in Campbell and Molinari is consistent with the natural duopoly 
theory of electoral regulation because it effectively turns primary elections into free 
markets separate from the natural duopoly constraint of general elections.  The First 
Amendment should protect the rights of voters to participate in primaries free from 
restrictive party organization imposed rules because it at least weakly promotes more 
unconstitutional and the state, rather than appealing, changed the law.  See id; Campbell II, 242 F. Supp 2d 
at 167.
227 Campbell II, 242 F. Supp 2d at 171.
228 Id. at 174.
229 Id. at 177.
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representative general elections.230  The state has no reason to impinge on these rights, 
because doing so would not promote clear choices for voters in general elections or 
decisive election results.
Nathaniel Persily, using a very different normative perspective, has come to a 
very similar conclusion, but with two crucial differences.231  Rather than judging party-
organization-created primary ballot access rules by the same standard as state laws 
regulating general election ballot access, he argues that they should be judged by a 
sliding scale depending on how important the primary is as a barrier to winning the 
general election (e.g. restrictive primary ballot access rules in one-party states should be 
treated more harshly).232  Moreover, courts should consider party interests separately and 
should, depending on the importance of the party interest, find those interests to be either 
“legitimate” or “compelling” enough to justify restrictions on the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of candidates and voters. It is necessary to consider both of these 
proposals in turn.
While it makes some kind of intuitive sense that elections in which one party is 
dominant should be treated differently than those in competitive districts, it is hard to see 
on closer inspection why party organizations in competitive areas should be able to close 
off access to the primary ballot.  If internal party competition is a good, then it should be 
a good everywhere.  Even if it is more important to have party competition in areas 
dominated by one party, because it is the only way to influence politics there, it still is 
230
 This includes the correlative – party organizations should not have a First Amendment right to impose 
restrictive rules on party primaries.
231 See Candidates v. Parties, supra note 10, at 2210-13
232 Id. at 2212-13, 2213-16
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better to have competition in primaries than not to have it.  These rules often flourish in 
areas that are generally competitive in general elections.  For instance, Campbell
overruled a primary ballot access rule in Connecticut, which has a great deal of inter-
party competition. 
Also, Persily’s rule would create an adjudicative nightmare.  While it is easy to 
recognize a one-party state, like the Texas of the White Primary Cases, courts would have 
to come up with a metric for determining when a district is competitive.  The panoply of 
choices – votes by party for President, votes in the particular race discussed, party 
registration – bespeaks the difficulty of determining how competitive a district is. This is 
especially problematic given the power of individual incumbents, which could skew the 
results of any of these determinations.  Also, courts would have to figure out how their 
determination of competitiveness relates to the level of the harm and how compelling the 
state’s (or the party’s) proffered interest is.  Given the already confusing and inconsistent 
nature of constitutional law surrounding elections, this rule hardly seems advisable.
Persily also argues that courts should consider the separate interests of parties as 
possible justifications for restrictive primary ballot access rules.  He notes that 
determining which of these interests are constitutionally permissible will be a difficult 
task.  For instance, he rules out arguing that a restriction is justified by wanting to rule 
out those candidates without much support because “the primary election, not the ballot 
access requirement, serves as the principal means of estimating the candidate's 
support.”233  The only interest Persily can devise that would justify restrictions is a desire 
to have a primary election winner selected by the majority, rather than a plurality, of the 
233 Id. at 2223.
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party.234  This may be in the party’s interest (as defined by the party organization) but it is 
not in the general interest.  Permitting a policy that aids political party organizations 
while harming the general public would be harmed hardly seems advisable.235
For these reasons, it is probably best to use same standard to judge state laws and 
party rules regulating primary ballot access.  Doing so, as part of the whole system of 
constitutional oversight of electoral regulation proposed in this paper, would best 
effectuate the ends of ensuring that officials are as representative of the preferences of 
voters as possible inside the structural constraints of the natural duopoly caused by 
Duverger’s Law and the normative constraints of maintaining party difference and 
ensuring the legitimacy of elections. 
IV: Conclusion: The Court Redeemed
It is easy for scholars to criticize the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on election 
law as overly simplistic and under-theorized.  After all, it surely is these things; the sheer 
number of cases requiring Supreme Court review in this area is testament to the fact that 
the current Constitutional jurisprudence in this area is unclear.  The opinions themselves 
seem all over the place in terms of their reliance on different theories of democracy.  
However, the actual answers the Court has given in election law cases are consistent with 
a sophisticated understanding of the effect of FPTP elections and competing ideas about 
the value of competition in a democratic state.  Justice Breyer’s dissent in Vieth, though, 
234 Id. at 2225.
235 See JUST ELECTIONS, supra note 24, at 82 (“To determine what rights parties should have, we should 
decide what ends they serve for citizens.”)
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makes clear that at least one member of the Court understand the case law in these terms.  
This paper, hopefully, has provided ballast for this understanding.  
